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INTRODUCTION

S

ituations of armed conflict almost invariably involve collaboration by civilians or combatants with an opposing
side. Parties to an armed conflict will seek to gain the upper
hand by turning their opponents’ people against them, while
individuals may cooperate with the enemy out of conviction,
desperation, or under coercion.1 Although the precise meaning
of the term collaboration is contested,2 common practices such
* Senior Lecturer and Deputy Director, Irish Centre for Human Rights,
National University of Ireland Galway (shane.darcy@nuigalway.ie).
1. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL 1056 57
(2015); U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF ARMED
CONFLICT 63 (2004).
2. Stathis N. Kalyvas, Collaboration in Comparative Perspective, 15 EUR.
REV. OF HIST. REVUE EUROPÉENNE D’HISTOIRE 109, 109 (2008); Henrik
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as disclosing information to an opposing side, defecting and
fighting for the enemy’s forces, engaging in propaganda for the
enemy’s benefit, or providing administrative support to an occupying power can be considered wartime collaboration.3 International humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts
does not expressly forbid such activity or the recruitment of collaborators.4 It does, however, prohibit the use of coercion for
such purposes, specifically against prisoners of war or civilians
in occupied territories.5 The law applicable in situations of
armed conflict also condemns the ill-treatment and abuse that
is frequently meted out to alleged collaborators during situations of armed conflict.6 The consequences for individuals who
collaborate with an enemy during wartime, however, might only manifest after the end of armed conflict, when evidence of
their actions comes to light, power dynamics shift, and relative
stability returns, allowing for a calling to account.
The post-conflict reckoning for those that may have served
the opposing side during wartime is often violent, as revenge is
regularly taken against alleged collaborators. In the immediate
aftermath of the Second World War, there was a “brutal settling of scores” by victims against fellow nationals who were
Dethlefsen, Denmark and the German Occupation: Cooperation, Negotiation
or Collaboration?, 15 SCANDINAVIAN J. HIST. 193, 198 200 (1990).
3. See, e.g., ISTVÁN DEÁK, EUROPE ON TRIAL: THE STORY OF
COLLABORATION, RESISTANCE, AND RETRIBUTION DURING WORLD WAR II (2015);
TIMOTHY BROOK, COLLABORATION: JAPANESE AGENTS AND LOCAL ELITES IN
WARTIME CHINA (2005); HILLEL COHEN, ARMY OF SHADOWS: PALESTINIAN
COLLABORATION WITH ZIONISM, 1917-1948 (Haim Watzman trans., 2008);
WERNER RINGS, LIFE WITH THE ENEMY: COLLABORATION AND RESISTANCE IN
HITLER’S EUROPE 1939-1945 (J. Maxwell Brownjohn trans., 1982).
4. See generally SHANE DARCY, TO SERVE THE ENEMY: INFORMERS,
COLLABORATORS AND THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT (2019).
5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art.
17, Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, art. 31, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
6. See, e.g. Rep. of the Int’l. Comm’n. of Inquiry on Darfur to the U.N.
Secretary-General Established Pursuant to Resolution 1564 (Sept. 18 2004),
¶402, (Jan. 25, 2005); Rep. of the Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum.
Rights on Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability and Human Rights in Sri
Lanka, ¶26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/61 (Sept. 16, 2015); see also generally Amnesty Int’l, Sierra Leone: The Extrajudicial Execution of Suspected Rebels and
Collaborators, AFR 51/02/92 (1992); B’TSELEM, COLLABORATORS IN THE
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND VIOLATIONS (1994).
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considered to have worked on behalf of the Axis Powers.7 As
will be discussed, retribution against collaborators has also
been pursued through formal legal processes, primarily criminal trials, lustration measures, and denaturalization proceedings. As with transitional justice processes more broadly, the
coming to terms with wartime collaboration by states, societies,
and individuals has involved a range of measures and mechanisms, both official and unofficial, along with a number of distinct challenges.8
This article explores the formal processes that have been employed to address the phenomenon of collaboration postconflict, focusing principally on trials, denaturalization efforts,
amnesties, and truth commissions. Drawing on relevant international law in this context, including the obligation of states
to ensure respect for human rights and the rights associated
with a fair trial, this article also considers key legal challenges
arising in the post-conflict processes that address wartime collaboration.
Part I of this article focuses on post-conflict measures of retribution that have been directed against collaborators, and it
does so in three parts. It begins in the first section with an examination of the purges of collaborators that followed the Second World War. During this period, thousands of suspected collaborators were subjected to revenge killings, violence, and
public humiliation.9 Many more faced trials, denial of civil
rights, and removal from their posts, in what has been described as “one of the greatest social and demographic upheavals in history.”10 The trials of prominent collaborators after the
Second World War, such as those of Vidkun Quisling in Norway and William Joyce in England, as well as more recent postconflict trials, have given rise to particular legal challenges,
which are explored in the second section. This article considers
how post-conflict trials of collaborators have addressed the rule
7. IAN KERSHAW, TO HELL AND BACK: EUROPE 1914-1949 479 (2016).
8. On transitional justice see generally Rep. of the S.C., U.N. Doc.
S/2004/616 (2004); Rep. of the S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2011/634 (2011); RUTI TEITEL,
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH V. JUSTICE (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006); RUTI TEITEL, GLOBALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS (2014).
9. DEÁK, supra note 3, at 191.
10. Id.
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of non-retroactivity of criminal law, the meaning of allegiance,
and the scope of the defense of duress as raised by those who
cooperated with an opposing side during conflict. The final section of Part I considers the potential denial of refugee status
under international law to those suspected of collaboration and
the subsequent withdrawal of citizenship of persons found to
have collaborated during the Second World War.
Part II of this article explores measures taken outside or
alongside criminal justice efforts and aimed at addressing wartime collaboration, as well as violence perpetrated against collaborators and their ostracization from society. While the postwar response to collaboration during armed conflict has often
been characterized by recrimination and retribution, state authorities have also resorted to other less punitive or nonpunitive measures in an effort to reconstruct war-torn societies,
promote peace and reconciliation, and rehabilitate individual
collaborators. The first section of Part II will examine the
granting of amnesty to collaborators who may thus avoid prosecution for their activities during an armed conflict, notwithstanding certain tensions arising with international law in this
context.11 The second section then considers the role of truth
commissions as an increasingly prominent feature of the transitional justice landscape.12 Although the phenomenon of collaboration has not been a significant feature of their work, as it
may defy the victim-perpetrator dichotomy that often prevails
before such bodies,13 some truth commissions have made valuable contributions to addressing the phenomenon. They have
11. See generally MARK FREEMAN, NECESSARY EVILS: AMNESTIES AND THE
SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 13 (2010); Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L. J.
2537 (1991); Diane Orentlicher, “Settling Accounts” Revisited: Reconciling
Global Norms with Local Agency, 1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 10 (2007);
LOUISE MALLINDER, AMNESTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS
(2008).
12. See generally PRISCILLA HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2011); MARK FREEMAN,
TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2007); TRUTH COMMISSION
AND COURTS: THE TENSION BETWEEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE SEARCH FOR
TRUTH (William A. Schabas & Shane Darcy eds., 2005).
13. See Ron Dudai, Informers and the Transition in Northern Ireland, 52
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 32, 48 (2012); Ron Dudai & Hillel Cohen, Triangle of
betrayal: Collaborators and Transitional Justice in the Israeli–Palestinian
Con ict, 6 J. HUM. RTS. 37 (2007).
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achieved this through establishing facts relating to the practice
of collaboration during armed conflict, exploring its context,
and elaborating on the consequences that may arise both during and after conflict. As the persecution of collaborators may
be “a serious hindrance to the process of reconciliation,”14 several truth commissions have made specific recommendations as
to how states can take measures to address the enduring and
often negative impact of collaboration following an armed conflict.
Part III of this article offers some conclusions and touches on
how the various processes examined can, to differing degrees,
meet some of the interrelated legal, social, and practical challenges facing post-conflict or transitional societies seeking to
come to terms with the legacy of wartime collaboration.
I. REVENGE, PROSECUTION, AND PUNISHMENT
Both official and unofficial responses to wartime collaborators in the aftermath of armed conflict have often been retributive and vengeful. As examined in this section, collaborators
have been subject to revenge killings, retaliatory violence,
criminal trials, denial of civil rights, and lustration proceedings
to remove them from their posts. The first subsection considers
the great purges of the Second World War, which saw thousands of collaborators held to account in various ways for activities considered to be in service of the enemy. The second subsection then considers the trials of collaborators and, in particular, how relevant judicial bodies examined key legal challenges, including the rule of non-retroactivity of criminal law, the
meaning of allegiance, and the scope of the defense of duress.
The potential immigration consequences for those suspected of
collaboration, including the denial of refugee status under international law and withdrawal of citizenship, are addressed in
the third subsection.
A. Post–Second World War Purges
Before the Second World War had ended, the major Allied
Powers had decided against proposals that the leaders of Nazi
Germany be executed outright if captured. Instead, they agreed
to subject the Nazi leadership to criminal trials before the In14. 5 THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA,
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 307 (1998).
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ternational Military Tribunal, which would sit at Nuremberg.15
Justice Robert H. Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor for the United
States at Nuremberg, saw this as “one of the most significant
tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason,” as the four Allies,
“flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay the hands of
vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the
judgment of the law.”16
Nationals of the Allied Powers who had collaborated with
Germany were subject to national, rather than international
criminal proceedings; in the words of one member of the United
Nations War Crimes Commission, “[t]he trial of quislings
would be left exclusively to the National Governments.”17 The
defeated nations were in some instances required to cooperate
in bringing to account wartime collaborators for their actions.
The peace agreement between Italy and the Allied Powers, for
example, required the former to take “all necessary measures”
to apprehend and surrender for trial both suspected war criminals and “[n]ationals of any Allied or Associated Power accused
of having violated their national law by treason or collaboration
with the enemy during the war.”18
Many thousands of collaborators were submitted to “the
judgment of the law” by the Allied nations, yet aggrieved populations in those countries also took the law into their own
hands. Significant numbers of alleged traitors were attacked
and killed towards the end of the Second World War and in its
immediate aftermath.19 Retribution against collaborators, alt-

15. ROBERT H. JACKSON, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO
CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 18 (1949).
16. Second Day, Wednesday, 11/21/1945, Part 04 in 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 1 (1947).
17. THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM’N, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF
WAR 114 (1948).
18. Treaty of Peace with Italy art. 45, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245, 49
U.N.T.S. 747.
19. See generally JON ELSTER, RETRIBUTION AND REPARATION IN THE
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (2006); THE POLITICS OF RETRIBUTION IN EUROPE:
WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH (István Deák et al. eds., 2000); BENAJMIN
FROMMER, NATIONAL CLEANSING: RETRIBUTION AGAINST NAZI COLLABORATORS
IN POSTWAR CZECHOSLOVAKIA (2005); DEÁK, supra note 3; HENRY L. MASON,
THE PURGE OF DUTCH QUISLINGS: EMERGENCY JUSTICE IN THE NETHERLANDS
(1952).
THE INTERNATIONAL
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hough not necessarily such violent reprisals, had much public
support in post-war Europe according to István Déak:
Just as accommodation to the wishes of the occupier had been
popular in most occupied countries, so now did the prosecution of collaborators meet with widespread public approval. It
was as if Europeans hoped to rid themselves of the memory of
their compromises and crimes by decimating their own
ranks.20

Not only were significant numbers of persons punished individually for their active cooperation with Nazi Germany, entire
ethnic groups were also punished on the basis of a claimed collective responsibility for their perceived collaboration.21 This
led to killings, imprisonment, and mass expulsions, particularly in Eastern Europe.22
Across Europe, retaliatory violence saw thousands of alleged
collaborators killed towards the end of the war by civilian mobs
and organized resistance.23 Italian partisans “carried out arbitrary executions of Fascist grandees, functionaries, collaborators and informers,” while in France, around 9,000 prominent
Vichy regime supporters were killed either extrajudicially or
following cursory court-martials (although some estimates put
the figure several times higher).24 United States soldiers in liberated France had to save suspected collaborators from being
summarily executed by their fellow citizens.25 Women were frequently targeted at the end of the Second World War for their
alleged associating with the enemy:
Women condemned as “horizontal collaborators” seen as
guilty of sleeping with the enemy often became scapegoats of
the pent-up anger of entire communities in western Europe.
In France, Italy, Denmark, Holland and the Channel Islands
such women were turned into social outcasts and ritually
humiliated in public by having their hair shorn, being
stripped naked, and sometimes having their bodies daubed
with excrement. In France alone about twenty thousand
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Deak et al., supra note 19, at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
KERSHAW, supra note 7, at 473.
Id. See PETER NOVICK, THE RESISTANCE VERSUS VICHY: THE PURGE OF
COLLABORATORS IN LIBERATED FRANCE 71 72, 78, 202 08 (1968); see also
DÉAK, supra note 3, at 200.
25. NOVICK, supra note 24, at 68.
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women were subjected to degradation in front of large
crowds overwhelmingly male from their local population.26

Reprisal attacks against alleged collaborators may have been
motivated at times by personal enmity, ethnic hatred, or to
cover up one’s own collaboration with the enemy during the
war.27 These violent episodes in Europe eventually gave way to
many states deploying more formal mechanisms to hold individual collaborators to account.28
Thousands of individual prosecutions for collaboration took
place after the Second World War. In Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and France, for example, it is estimated that
170,000 collaborators were given prison sentences after being
tried before regular courts, 11,000 were sentenced to death,
and 2,500 were executed.29 Over 90,000 Norwegians were tried
for treason, around four percent of the population, with 17,000
imprisoned and thirty executed.30 Those tried and executed in
Europe included high-ranking individuals, such as former
heads of state and prime ministers from a number of countries;
the Communist government in Bulgaria, for example, executed
the previous prime minister, twenty-four members of the cabinet, and sixty-eight members of parliament for treason and
“crimes against the people.”31
Collaborator trials that took place in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union saw prosecutions on the basis of an extremely
broad understanding of collaboration. This definition embraced
those who had actively served the Axis Powers, as well as prisoners of war considered traitors for having been captured and
civilians who merely happened to be present in territories occupied by Germany.32 Several hundred thousand alleged col-

26. KERSHAW, supra note 7, at 474. See also Anthony Beever, An Ugly
Carnival,
GUARDIAN,
(June
4,
2009),
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2009/jun/05/women-victims-d-daylandings-second-world-war.
27. DÉAK, supra note 3, at 181; KERSHAW, supra note 7, at 473.
28. NOVICK, supra note 24, at 61 63.
29. RINGS, supra note 3, at 323.
30. DEÁK, supra note 3, at 204.
31. Id. at 192.
32. CHERIF M. BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HISTORICAL
EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 157 58 (2011); DEÁK, supra note
3, at 193 207; Tanja Penter, Local Collaborators on Trial: Soviet war crimes
trials under Stalin (1943-1953), 49 CAHIERS DU MONDE RUSSE 341, 351 (2008).
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laborators were executed in the Soviet Union.33 Tanja Penter
considers that, in the Soviet context, “the postwar settlement
with collaborators was much more intense and bloodier than
the prosecution of German war criminals.”34 In most jurisdictions in Asia, treason trials for locals accused of having collaborated with the Japanese forces “were conducted more promptly
than the war crimes trials of Japanese.”35 The British held collaborator trials in Hong Kong pursuant to a defense regulation
known as the “Quisling Directive,” as well as under the United
Kingdom’s Treason Act of 1351.36 Around 25,000 alleged collaborators with Japan were tried by the Chinese authorities in the
two years following the end of the Second World War.37
Collapsed or compromised criminal justice systems presented
an obstacle to the trial of alleged collaborators after the Second
World War. Judges may have continued to serve under regimes
of occupation or even aligned themselves with the Nazi party,
with the result that novice judges or those who were “politically
tainted” sat in a number of trials.38 Revolutionary courts were
established by the resistance to try collaborators in newly liberated territories in Europe, but they were eventually divested
of power and trials were conducted by regular courts although
courts in Eastern Europe remained “consistently revolutionary”
and continued to operate against real or imagined enemies of
Communism after having targeted fascists and alleged collaborators.39
In France, André Philip, who served as Minister of the Interior for the Free French, made the case for pursuing justice for
33. MAX HASTINGS, THE SECRET WAR: SPIES, CODES AND GUERILLAS 19391945 20 (2015); VADIM J. BIRSTEIN, SMERSH, STALIN’S SECRET WEAPON:
SOVIET MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR II 174 75 (2011).
34. Penter, supra note 32, at 342 43.
35. Kerstin von Lingen and Robert Cribb, War Crimes Trials in Asia: Collaboration and Complicity in the Aftermath of War, in DEBATING
COLLABORATION AND COMPLICITY IN WAR CRIMES TRIALS IN ASIA, 1945-1956 1, 8
(Kerstin von Lingen ed., 2017). See also generally Margherita Zanasi, Globalizing Hanjian: The Suzhou Trials and the Post-World War II Discourse on
Collaboration, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 731 (2008).
36. Suzannah Linton, Rediscovering the War Crimes Trials in Hong Kong,
1946-1948, 13 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 1, 52 53 (2012).
37. Dongyoun Hwang, Wartime Collaboration in Question: An Examination of the Postwar Trials of the Chinese Collaborators, 6 INTER-ASIA
CULTURAL STUD. 75, 75 (2005).
38. DEÁK, supra note 3, at 203.
39. Deák et al., supra note 19, at 10 11.
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collaborators through regular judicial processes rather than by
way of vengeful acts outside the law:
If we heeded the appeal of our heart and our indignation, all
of us would go as far as some of our colleagues desire, and
shoot the guilty out of hand. How understandable that would
be, when we think of the torture which our comrades in
France are undergoing. How legitimate and excusable it
would be for us to use the same procedure as our enemies.
But we aren’t Vichy, we aren’t the Germans. We stand for liberty, respect for the law, and belief in human dignity; it was
to affirm these beliefs that we have struggled and resisted. [. .
.] Our true grandeur will lie in maintaining and respecting
our national traditions . . . in our unshakable devotion to justice and respect for individual rights, even those of the most
despicable criminals.40

Most countries had to adapt their legal processes in some way
in order to accommodate collaborator trials on such a scale; for
example, military courts were used in Belgium and special
courts in Holland, both of which were made up of a combination of civil and military judges.41 In Belgium, over 50,000 prisoners were awaiting trial in 1945 in jails “designed to house a
tenth of that number.”42 In some European countries, the volume of trials was reduced by accused collaborators agreeing to
admit their guilt and accept a penalty as proposed by the prosecution.43
Criminal prosecution and punishment of those accused of assisting an opposing belligerent were not the only means envisaged by the relevant authorities seeking to hold collaborators
to account. The Charter of the French National Council of the
Resistance, for example, emphasized both “the punishment of
traitors and the eviction from the administration and professional life of all those who have dealt with the enemy or have
actively associated themselves with the policy of the governments of collaboration.”44 In terms of criminal trials of collaborators in France, Peter Novick estimates that over 6,500 death
40. NOVICK, supra note 24, at 141.
41. Id. at 213 14.
42. RINGS, supra note 3, at 70.
43. DAVID LITTLEJOHN, PATRIOTIC TRAITORS: A HISTORY OF COLLABORATION
IN GERMAN-OCCUPIED EUROPE, 1940 1945 127 (1972); NOVICK, supra note 24,
at 213 14.
44. NOVICK, supra note 24, at 38.
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sentences were handed down, of which 767 were carried out,
while there were 2,702 sentences of life imprisonment with
hard labor, 10,637 terms with hard labor, 2,044 sentences of
solitary confinement, and 22,883 sentences of imprisonment.45
Around 50,000 individuals had “[n]ational degradation” visited
upon them, meaning they were punished by the denial of certain civil and political rights.46 This penalty arose for those
found guilty of the newly-created concept of “national indignity,” described as “a kind of low-grade treason, involving active
participation in the Vichy government, membership in groups
supporting it, or propaganda in its favor.”47
Lustration also occurred in post-war France, with an administrative purge that saw several thousand police, judges, and
civil servants removed from their posts for collaboration of varying degrees.48 Pursuant to the administrative process established in France, individuals could be reprimanded, dismissed
without pension, or referred for possible criminal proceedings.49
Similar processes were adopted in other countries; in the Netherlands, for example, around half the town mayors and 2,000
police officers were dismissed upon liberation, while around
60,000 individuals were deprived of their Dutch citizenship and
had their property seized for “entering foreign military service.”50 Around 20,000 women who were married to such collaborators also lost their citizenship,51 and in Norway, laws
were introduced to deny citizenship rights to children born to
Norwegian women of German fathers.52 A denazification process was also undertaken in Germany itself after the war, as
well as the prosecution of those who had informed on their fellow citizens by denouncing them to the authorities, particularly
the Gestapo.53
45. Id. at 186.
46. Id.
47. Jon Elster, Redemption for Wrongdoing: The Fate of Collaborators after
1945, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 324, 326 (2006).
48. NOVICK, supra note 24, at 79 93.
49. Id.
50. LITTLEJOHN, supra note 43, at 127; see also DEÁK, supra note 3, at 205.
51. LITTLEJOHN, supra note 43, at 128.
52. DEÁK, supra note 3, at 204.
53. See FRANCIS GRAHAM-DIXON, THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF GERMANY: THE
REFUGEE CRISIS, DENAZIFICATION AND THE PATH TO RECONSTRUCTION (2013);
ANDREW SZANAJDA, INDIRECT PERPETRATORS: THE PROSECUTION OF INFORMERS
IN GERMANY, 1945 1965 (2010).
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Hundreds of thousands of individuals paid the price for collaboration with Germany, Japan, and their allies during the
Second World War. Innocent individuals were at times the targets of mob violence, criminal prosecution, or administrative
purges.54 Relatives and even entire ethnic groups also suffered
the consequences of collaboration by association.55 Even when
collaborators were dealt with judicially, there were often shortcomings with the trials undertaken. Trials in France, for example, were criticized on the grounds of selectivity, delay, and
inconsistencies in sentencing.56 Serious fair trial concerns have
been raised regarding Soviet collaborator trials, including insufficient notice to defendants of charges, inexperienced officials, and arbitrary sentencing.57
Not all collaborators received harsh punishment. Economic
collaborators were at times treated more leniently on the basis
that they had to make a living.58 Civil servants and police in
Holland involved in the persecution of Jews and the suppression of resistance were treated lightly.59 Although harsh sentences and sanctions were imposed on significant numbers of
individuals who had supported the Axis Powers, pardons,
commutations, and amnesties were widely used in Europe. As
such, few collaborators called to account in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War continued to suffer the consequences of their actions, at least formally, within a couple of
decades.60 As Ian Kershaw observed, “[c]ourts became more lenient as the immediacy of the war receded. Everywhere, rebuilding a functioning state took priority over punishment and
retaliation for wartime behaviour, other than in the direst cases.”61 Collaborator trials that were held following the Second
World War and since that time have been confronted by a
number of recurring legal issues, which are examined in the
next section.
54. NOVICK, supra note 24, at 78.
55. Penter, supra note 32, at 343.
56. NOVICK, supra note 24, at 157, 162 63, 168, 172.
57. See Penter, supra note 32, at 342 51.
58. NOVICK, supra note 24, at 162.
59. KERSHAW, supra note 7, at 480. But see LITTLEJOHN, supra note 43, at
129.
60. NOVICK, supra note 24, at 92, 187 88; LITTLEJOHN, supra note 43, at
128; KERSHAW, supra note 7, at 480.
61. KERSHAW, supra note 7, at 481.
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B. Trials for Collaboration
Criminal trials have been a frequent feature of the postconflict landscape of countries emerging from war. While the
trial of individuals for international crimes has garnered much
attention, it is likely that as many, if not more trials have been
held in the aftermath of armed conflict for domestic criminal
offenses relating to the conflict. Those that collaborate with an
adversary during an armed conflict may be responsible for international crimes, such as war crimes or crimes against humanity, as well as relevant offenses under national law.62 It is
interesting to note that neither of the major post Second World
War trials in Nuremberg nor Tokyo included charges against
German or Japanese officials for the ill-treatment of collaborators during the war. As noted in the Justice case, such conduct
did not fit the prevailing definition of war crimes, although it
could have been captured by crimes against humanity or certain domestic offenses, as occurred in a small number of cases.63
Challenging legal questions have arisen in the post-conflict
trials of collaborators, specifically concerning non-retroactivity,
the meaning of allegiance, and the applicability of relevant defenses or mitigating factors. This section explores a number of
central legal issues arising in the trials of collaborators, drawing on key post Second World War and subsequent trials, as
well as relevant international standards, including the principle of legality.
1. Crime and Punishment
Trials for collaboration have at times given rise to tension
with the principle of legality, in particular its requirements of
strict interpretation of penal statutes and the non-retroactivity
of criminal law. The Permanent Court of International Justice
62. See DEÁK, supra note 3, at 74; ERIC LICHTBLAU, THE NAZIS NEXT DOOR:
HOW AMERICA BECAME A SAFE HAVE FOR HITLER’S MEN 48 49 (2014); Penter,
supra note 32, at 344.
63. See SZANAJDA, supra note 53, at 40 43; “The Justice Case” in 3 TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 1090, 1095, 1118 28 (1951); see generally W.L.
Cheah, Dealing with Desertion and Gaps in International Humanitarian
Law: Changes of Allegiance in the Singapore War Crimes Trials, 8 ASIAN J.
INT’L L. 350 (2018); For reliance on the concept of war crimes see generally
Kononov v. Latvia, 2010 - IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 35.
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described the principle of legality as a “well-known” maxim in
1935:
The law alone determines and defines an offence. The law
alone decrees the penalty. A penalty cannot be inflicted in a
given case if it is not decreed by the law in respect of that
case. A penalty decreed by the law for a particular case cannot be inflicted in another case. In other words, criminal laws
may not be applied by analogy.64

The rule against retroactive criminal laws, which is common to
all national legal systems, also finds expression in various international instruments, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaims that “[n]o one shall be
held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed.”65 Rebecca West’s observation that the law “is always vainly racing
to catch up with experience,” can be applied to both the prosecution of international crimes and the trials for wartime collaboration after the Second World War.66 A number of European
countries that sought to try wartime collaborators were faced
with issues of retroactivity, as the differing degrees and forms
of collaboration that offenders engaged in during the war were
not all captured by existing legislation on treason or similar
crimes.67 Similarly, some states that sought to have the death
penalty available for high-profile cases had previously abolished capital punishment.68
With regard to criminal offenses, serious instances of collaboration with the enemy usually amount to the crime of treason,
which national criminal law invariably treats as an especially
grave crime, “since [it] strike[s] at the very foundation of the
State and its social organizations.”69 The United States Consti64. Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution of the Free City, Advisory Opinion, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 65, at 14
(Dec. 4).
65. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 71,
art.11 (Dec. 10, 1948); see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, arts. 22 24, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
66. REBECCA WEST, THE MEANING OF TREASON 63 (1947).
67. NOVICK, supra note 24, at 209 12.
68. Id.
69. ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 236 (4th ed., 2003).
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tution establishes that “[t]reason against the United States
shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering
to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort.”70 These terms
capture many acts of collaboration, although the offense of
treason is broader and not always limited to assisting the
state’s enemies, as it might also include “attempting by force of
arms or other violent means to overthrow the organs of government.”71 With the crime of treason generally confined to
times of war or armed rebellion, it is necessary to distinguish
the offense from so-called “war treason,” which has been understood as offenses committed by the inhabitants of an occupied territory against the occupying power.72
Despite the significant rhetorical and moral force attached to
the crime of treason, and the frequent use of the term in political discourse, the crime is prosecuted less and less. There have
been few, if any, modern prosecutions for treason in the United
States.73 Moreover, the period surrounding the Second World
War accounted for the last treason trials in many Western democracies. The decline may be partly attributable to treason as
a political offense, one which, as Hersh Lauterpacht noted, has
served “as an instrument of despotism and oppression.”74
Prominent post-war trials for collaboration, notably that of
William Joyce, have been based solely on the crime of treason.75
Others, such as the trial of Vidkun Quisling, have seen treason
70. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
71. See Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 39. See also Mary Connery, Hung,
Drawn and Quartered? The Future of the Constitutional Reference to Treason,
5 TRINITY COLLEGE L. REV. 56 (2002).
72. YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND ITS INTERACTION WITH
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 43 (2009); L. Oppenheim, On War Treason, 33 L. Q. REV. 266 (1917); J.H. Morgan, War Treason, in 2 THE GROTIUS
SOCIETY: PROBLEMS OF THE WAR 161 (1916).
73. See generally Captain Jabez W. Loane, IV, Treason and Aiding the
Enemy, 30 MIL. L. REV. 43 (1965); George P. Fletcher, The Case for Treason 41
MD. L. REV. 193 (1982); Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional
Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863
(2006).
74. Hersh Lauterpacht, Allegiance, Diplomatic Protection and Criminal
Jurisdiction over Aliens, 9 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 330, 334 (1947); See generally e.g.
L.J. Blom-Cooper, The South African Treason Trial: R. v. Adams and Others,
8 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 59 (1959); KENNETH S. BROUN, SAVING NELSON MANDELA:
THE RIVONIA TRIAL AND THE FATE OF SOUTH AFRICA (2012).
75. R. v. Joyce [1945] 2 All ER 673 (Eng.).
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charged alongside various other crimes.76 Offenses such as “assisting the enemy” or “intelligence with the enemy” have also
formed the basis for post-war prosecution of collaborators, as
well as crimes specifically developed after a conflict, including
the French “national indignity” offense.77 There was a challenge after the Second World War concerning where to draw
the line of criminality, for as Kerstin von Lingen and Robert
Cribb noted, the distinction “between innocuous engagement,
which amounted to no more than sustaining daily life, and collaboration, which actively assisted the enemy, was nowhere
clear or certain.”78
A wide range of activity could be conceived of as aiding the
enemy, as confirmed by this interpretation by the Dutch Court
of Cassation:
[That] every intentional co-operation with strivings of the enemy, which strivings are directly or indirectly connected with
the war, and in which the enemy sees profit in connection
with his warfare, by which co-operation the position of the enemy is morally or materially strengthened, has to be considered as assistance to the enemy, and as such endangers the
safety of the State.79

In post-liberation France, treason and the offense of “intelligence with the enemy” under the French Penal Code were used
to prosecute high-ranking French collaborators.80 Philippe Pétain, the head of the Vichy regime who had famously first used
the term “collaboration” to describe cooperation with the German occupiers, was tried before the Haute Cour de Justice,
which had been specially created for the purpose of trying leading collaborators.81 Pétain’s claims that his collaboration was
for the benefit of France did not prevent a guilty verdict on the
charge of “intelligence with the enemy,” for which he received a
death sentence, albeit with a jury recommendation that it not

76. See HANS FREDRIK DAHL, QUISLING: A STUDY IN TREACHERY (1999).
77. See NOVICK, supra note 24, at 146 48.
78. Von Lingen & Cribb, supra note 35, at 2. For a discussion of whether
bureaucratic collaboration should constitute a criminal offense see MICHAEL
L. GROSS, THE ETHICS OF INSURGENCY 112 (2015).
79. B.V.A. Röling, The Law of War and the National Jurisdiction Since
1945, in 100 RECUEIL DE COURS 411 (1960).
80. See Code Pénal 1810 [C. Pén.][French Penal Code] Articles 75-78 (Fr.).
81. See NOVICK, supra note 24, at 154 56.
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be carried out.82 Pierre Laval, the Prime Minister of Vichy
France, was also convicted on similar charges, and was executed by firing squad (shortly after having ingested poison).83 The
journalist Robert Brassilach was convicted of, and executed for,
the offense of “intelligence with the enemy” for his writings and
editorship of a pro-Nazi newspaper during the German occupation.84
A number of Vichy officials were prosecuted for crimes
against humanity decades after the Second World War, following a change in France’s domestic law. Maurice Papon, a senior
police official in the Vichy regime, was found complicit in sending hundreds of Jews to concentration camps and sentenced to
ten years imprisonment in 1997.85 A life sentence was handed
down to Paul Touvier, an official of the paramilitary organization, Milice, which had collaborated in the persecution of
French Jews. Touvier was convicted in absentia for treason and
providing intelligence to the enemy after the war, subsequently
pardoned, but ultimately found guilty of crimes against humanity around fifty years after their commission.86
While offenses such as treason and “intelligence with the enemy” were established crimes under French law, there had
been concerns as to how they would be applied to Vichy officials
or other collaborators, and whether they could lead to the prosecution of “too few and too harshly.”87 The French government
adopted legislation providing interpretations of the relevant
offenses for the use of the courts, while the concept of “national
indignity” was introduced to ensure that collaborators whose
acts did not constitute already existing offenses could be re-

82. Id. at 176.
83. Id. at 177. See generally J. KENNETH BRODY, THE TRIAL OF PIERRE
LAVAL: DEFINING TREASON, COLLABORATION AND PATRIOTISM IN WORLD WAR II
FRANCE (2010).
84. See generally ALICE KAPLAN, THE COLLABORATOR: THE TRIAL &
EXECUTION OF ROBERT BRASSILACH (2000).
85. See Nancy Wood, Memory on Trial in Contemporary France: The Case
of Maurice Papon, 11 HIST. & MEMORY 41 (1999); see also Papon v. France,
App. No. 4210/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002).
86. See Leila Sadat Wexler, Reflections on the Trial of Vichy Collaborator
Paul Touvier for Crimes Against Humanity in France, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
191 (1995); see also Touvier v. France, App. No. 29420/95, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(1997).
87. NOVICK, supra note 24, at 143 45.
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moved from certain positions. The rationale behind the latter
was as follows:
The criminal conduct of those who collaborated with the enemy did not always take the form of a specific act for which
there could be provided a specific penalty . . . under a strict
interpretation of the law. Frequently it has been a question of
antinational activity reprehensible in itself. Moreover, the
disciplinary measures by which unworthy officials could be
removed from the administration are not applicable to other
sections of society. And it is necessary to bar certain individuals from various elective, economic, and professional positions
which give their incumbents political influence, as it is to
eliminate others from the ranks of the administration.
Any Frenchman who, even without having violated an existing penal law, has been guilty of activity defined as antinational, has degraded himself; he is an unworthy citizen whose
rights must be restricted in so far as he has failed in his duties.88

The courts were to determine the appropriate penalty and
whether there were any extenuating circumstances, although
questions were raised regarding the impartiality of the jury
panels whose members were drawn largely from the Resistance.89
Reliance on retroactive laws and exceptional courts weakened
the system of justice deployed against French collaborators,
even if understandable in light of the unique situation prevailing at the time.90 When faced with similar concerns of retroactivity regarding the prosecution of crimes against peace, the
Nuremberg Tribunal concluded that, for an aggressor who
must have known that he was doing wrong, “far from being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed
to go unpunished.”91 The European Court of Human Rights has
also acknowledged, albeit implicitly, the tension between the
principle of legality and “laws which, in the wholly exceptional
88. See id. at 147.
89. Id. at 148 53.
90. Id. at 156. See also Wartime Collaborators: A Comparative Study of the
Effect of their Trials on the Treason Law of Great Britain, Switzerland and
France, 56 YALE L. J. 1210, 1233 (1946-1947).
91. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 1 October 1946, 41 AM. J. INT. L. 172, 217 (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg
Judgment].
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circumstances at the end of the Second World War, were
passed in order to punish war crimes, treason, and collaboration with the enemy.”92 Although the principle of legality had
yet to be enshrined in international human rights law, it was
already recognized in national legal systems,93 though ultimately it did not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to the
application of laws with retroactive effect during the post-war
period.
The principle of legality was also at issue where sentences of
capital punishment were handed down in countries that had
abolished the death penalty prior to the Second World War.
Both Denmark and Holland adopted legislation to reintroduce
the death penalty for “extreme cases of collaboration or crimes
against humanity,” and several dozen convicted persons were
executed in both countries after the war.94 The application of
the death penalty was challenged in the trial in Norway of
Vidkun Quisling, one of the Second World War’s most infamous
collaborators. The Nuremberg Judgment described Quisling as
“the notorious Norwegian traitor,”95 and his surname is commonly used in contemporary discourse to describe “a person
who helps an enemy who has taken control of his or her country.”96 Norway had shown “a consistent harshness towards its
own citizens who had committed treason,”97 prosecuting thousands for collaboration with Germany, thirty of whom were executed, Quisling included.
Although the question of retroactivity has been raised in relation to the crimes for which Quisling was convicted,98 the
principle of legality was most clearly infringed by the application of capital punishment. As Paul Hayes explained:
Before the war the Norwegian penal code had included no
death penalty. The government in London had sought to rem92. Kononov v. Latvia, App No. 36376/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 115 (2008).
93. See generally KENNETH GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 46 65 (2010).
94. LITTLEJOHN, supra note 43, at 82, 127; DEÁK, supra note 3, at 204.
95. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 91, at 204.
96. OXFORD ADVANCED LEARNER’S DICTIONARY: QUISLING NOUN,
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/quisling.
97. Sigrid Redse Johansen, The Occupied and The Occupier: The Case of
Norway, in SEARCHING FOR A “PRINCIPLE OF HUMANITY” IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, 206, 227 (Kjetil Mujenovi Larsen et al. eds., 2013).
98. JOHN LAUGHLAND, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL TRIALS 96 (2008).

94

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 45:1

edy this omission by promulgation of its law regarding treason on 15 December 1944. For those who wished to dispose of
Quisling by legal means this raised yet another formidable
stumbling-block, for beside the other difficulties, there existed
the question of the legality of the retrospective imposition of
the treason law.99

Quisling was charged with a range of offenses, including treason and assisting the enemy, and as was the case in other collaborator trials, the impartiality of certain judges was questioned on account of their activities and experiences during the
war.100 Found guilty at trial, Quisling appealed his conviction
and sentence to the Supreme Court of Norway, which upheld
the verdict and sentence while dismissing his arguments concerning retroactivity.101 Quisling was executed by firing squad
on October 24, 1945.102 While the application of the sentence
was not in conformity with the principle of legality, it was in
keeping with a strong public demand for the death penalty;
several of the guards responsible for Quisling’s safety during
his trial had even gone so far as to secretly agree to kill him if
the Court did not hand down a sentence of death.103
2. Allegiance
That an occupying power must respect the duty of allegiance
owed by citizens to their own state is inscribed in international
humanitarian law. For example, Article 45 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations prohibits compelling the local population to take
an oath of allegiance to an occupying power.104 Although international law does not forbid citizens from breaching their duty
99. PAUL M. HAYES, QUISLING: THE CAREER AND POLITICAL IDEALS OF
VIDKUN QUISLING 1887-1945 299 (1971) (footnote omitted); see also DAHL, supra note 76.
100. Id. at 299 300.
101. Id. at 302 03. See also DAHL, supra note 76, at 398 400; Public Prosecutor v. Reidar Haaland (August 9, 1945) reprinted in 12 ANN. DIG. AND REP.
OF PUB. INT’L L. CASES: YEARS 1943-1945 444, 445 (Hersh Lauterpacht ed.
1949).
102. Quisling Executed by Firing Squad, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 24, 1945, at A1.
103. DAHL, supra note 76, at 393.
104. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, art. 45, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 227. See also Geneva Convention III,
supra note 5, arts. 87, 100; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5, arts. 68, 98,
105, 107, 135.
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of allegiance voluntarily, national law invariably does. The
crime of treason comprises an offense against the state entailing a breach of this duty of allegiance, which the state treats as
the corollary of the protection it is required to afford its citizens.105 Trials for collaboration after the Second World War at
times gave rise to questions regarding the duty of allegiance of
particular individuals who were not nationals of the state in
question. Treason trials held by the British in Hong Kong, for
example, claimed an obligation of allegiance on the part of colonial subjects.106 The issue of allegiance was the key legal concern in the most prominent post-war trial held in the United
Kingdom that of William Joyce, known as “Lord Haw Haw,”
who was found guilty of high treason and executed for his contribution to the propaganda broadcasts of Nazi Germany.107
Following the Second World War, British authorities detained over 120 alleged collaborators in the United Kingdom,
comprised of either civilians who had lived abroad during the
war, or captured members of the armed forces who had divulged information to the enemy, around half of whom were
released without trial.108 The prosecuting counsel in the case
against Joyce was Attorney General Hartley Shawcross, who
had been the British Prosecutor at Nuremberg.109 He was advised by Hersch Lauterpacht, who had worked with him on the
Nuremberg trial.110 Lauterpacht later wrote that the trial of
Joyce was “concerned to a large extent with matters of interest
for international law,” touching as it did on questions of allegiance by aliens, jurisdiction over the acts of aliens committed
abroad, and diplomatic protection.111 He had also prepared a
memorandum that contemplated the prosecution of Joyce as a
major war criminal under the London Agreement establishing

105. REBECCA WEST, THE NEW MEANING OF TREASON 361 (1964).
106. Von Lingen & Cribb, supra note 35, at 6 8. See also Cheah, supra note
63, at 356.
107. See generally WEST, supra note 105; PETER MARTLAND, LORD HAW HAW:
THE ENGLISH VOICE OF NAZI GERMANY (2003); COLIN HOLMES, SEARCHING FOR
LORD HAW-HAW: THE POLITICAL LIVES OF WILLIAM JOYCE (2016); S.C. Biggs,
Treason and the Trial of William Joyce, 7 UNIV. TORONTO L. J. 162 (1947).
108. Wartime Collaborators, supra note 90, at 1212.
109. SIR ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, THE LIFE OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 275 (2010).
110. Id.
111. Lauterpacht, supra note 74, at 330.
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the Nuremberg Tribunal, although this was not pursued because of the successful domestic conviction for treason.112
The prosecution of Joyce hinged on his relationship with the
United Kingdom at the time he engaged in Nazi propaganda
broadcasts during the Second World War. Although born in the
United States and having lived in Ireland for a number of
years, Joyce had moved to England and acquired a British
passport in 1933, before leaving for Germany in 1939 and
seemingly acquiring German nationality the following year.113
A key question to be addressed was whether Joyce owed allegiance to the King of England as an American citizen by birth
who had obtained a British passport under false pretenses and
then assumed the nationality of an enemy state.114 There was
no doubt that he was an avowed fascist and anti-Semite who
willfully participated in Nazi Germany’s propaganda efforts
during the Second World War.115 However, there was little attention paid to these activities during the trial. Instead, the
tribunal focused on whether a non-resident alien who held a
British passport could commit the crime of treason abroad.116
Without owing allegiance to the British Crown, no act of treason could be committed.
Ultimately, Joyce was charged with three counts of high
treason for his propaganda activity and for seeking to become a
naturalized subject of Germany.117 Two of the counts were unsuccessful, as they were based on the incorrect assumption that
he was a British subject at the relevant times, but he was convicted of high treason on the following count:
William Joyce, on September 18, 1939, and on divers other
days thereafter and between that day and July 2, 1940, being
then [ ] to wit on the several days [ ] a person owing allegiance to our Lord the King, and whilst on the said several
days an open and public war was being prosecuted and carried on by the German Realm and its subjects against our
Lord the King and his subjects, then and on the said several
days traitorously contriving and intending to aid and assist
112. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 109, at 280.
113. WEST, supra note 105, at 10 11; Lauterpacht, supra note 74, at 333.
114. WEST, supra note 105, at 12 13.
115. HOLMES, supra note 107, at 83, 171 98.
116. Wartime Collaborators, supra note 90, at 1215.
117. Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] AC (HL) 347, 348 (appeal taken from Eng.).

2019]

Coming to Terms with Wartime Collaboration

97

the said enemies of our Lord the King against our Lord the
King and his subjects did traitorously adhere to and aid and
comfort the said enemies in parts beyond the seas without the
Realm of England, to wit, in the Realm of Germany by broadcasting to the subjects of our Lord the King propaganda on
behalf of the said enemies of our Lord the King. 118

During this period of time, Joyce was the holder of a British
passport, which he had obtained based on the claim that he
was a British subject born in pre-independence Ireland, even
though he was a natural born citizen of the United States.119
The trial judge had instructed the jury that “the prisoner beyond a shadow of doubt owed allegiance to the Crown of this
country” while the holder of a British passport, and the jury
proceeded to return a guilty verdict that Joyce had adhered to
and assisted the King’s enemies by his activities.120 He was
sentenced to death on September 19, 1945.121
Joyce’s appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeal and the
House of Lords were unsuccessful, and he was executed on
January 3, 1946.122 The judges of the Court of Criminal Appeal
ruled that Joyce had owed allegiance to the Crown at the relevant time even though he had been “beyond the realm,” as he
held a British passport that “entitled him to all the rights and
protection afforded by such a passport, even if the appellant
had obtained it by misrepresentation and had no intention of
using it.”123 Although Joyce had left England for Germany before the war, by renewing his passport he had “taken every
step in his power to safeguard his right of re-entry into England, and meanwhile to ensure his treatment in any foreign
country as a British citizen.”124 Such protection demanded allegiance; as Lauterpacht noted, allegiance is “concomitant with
the protection of the law which shelters him.”125 The majority
in the House of Lords decision took the same view, finding that
118. Id.
119. Id. at 348 49.
120. Id. at 349 50.
121. Id. at 350.
122. Lord
Haw
Haw
Hanged,
GUARDIAN,
(Jan.
4,
1946),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/04/lord-haw-haw-executedwilliam-joyce-1946.
123. R. v. Joyce [1945] 2 All ER 673, at 673 75 (Eng.).
124. Id. at 676 77.
125. Lauterpacht, supra note 74, at 335.
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“by the holding of a passport he asserts and maintains the relation in which he formerly stood, claiming the continued protection of the Crown and thereby pledging the continuance of his
fidelity.”126 “In these circumstances,” Lord Howitt wrote, “I am
clearly of the opinion that so long as he holds the passport he is
within the meaning of the statute a man who, if he is adherent
to the King’s enemies in the realm or elsewhere commits an act
of treason.”127 As to the jurisdiction of the English courts over a
crime committed in Germany, “no principle of comity demands
that a State should ignore the crime of treason committed
against it outside its territory.”128
Joyce’s conviction and execution for high treason was a relief
for the British government, which had put in place a contingency plan to deport him to Germany in the event of an acquittal.129 There was criticism, however, as Joyce was not a British
national when he had contributed to the Nazi war effort, and
there was a perception that “the law had been tainted by revenge.”130 The remark by historian A.J.P. Taylor that “Joyce
was hanged for making a false statement when applying for a
passport, the usual penalty for which is a small fine,”131 was an
oversimplification. It serves, however, to underscore how the
proceedings against Joyce were focused primarily on the technical question of whether a legal basis existed for the claimed
allegiance on his part. The trial was concerned with the existence of Joyce’s duty not to engage in activity that could be considered harmful to the United Kingdom, rather than examining
the specific harms that he may have caused by his activities in
support of Nazi Germany.
Joyce was the last person to be executed for treason in the
United Kingdom, and although the prosecution of treason has
waned in Western countries, the duty of allegiance persists and
treason remains a crime in most, if not all, jurisdictions.132 The
126. Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] AC (HL) 347, 371 (appeal taken from Eng.).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 372.
129. HOLMES, supra note 107, at 348.
130. WEST, supra note 105, at 37 39.
131. A.J.P. TAYLOR, ENGLISH HISTORY 1914 1945 534 (1965).
132. See George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence about Treason 82 N. C. L. REV.
1611, 1625 28 (2005); see also generally Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treason in
the Age of Terrorism: An Explanation and Evaluation of the Treason’s Return
in Democratic States, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1443 (2009).

2019]

Coming to Terms with Wartime Collaboration

99

drafters of the 1949 Geneva Conventions had the trial of Joyce
in mind when they took care to ensure that the treaties would
not be an obstacle to such domestic prosecutions of suspected
collaborators.133
3. Victims of circumstances?
Collaboration with the enemy during an armed conflict is not
always freely undertaken, reflecting the propensity of parties
to an armed conflict to force civilians and prisoners of war to
provide valuable information or contribute in other ways to
their military and security efforts.134 It is unsurprising, therefore, that trials for collaboration have seen a range of excuses
and justifications put forward by accused persons seeking to
defend their actions in the hope of garnering an acquittal or
mitigating their sentence. Such excuses have included the defenses of duress or necessity where acts were committed under severe coercion to claims of playing a double game of both
collaboration and resistance simultaneously, or of engaging in
collaboration as a lesser evil in order to lessen the cruelties of
the enemy. Werner Rings devised a typology of collaboration in
Europe during the Second World War that described the “neutral collaborator” as one who would claim that their attitude
was “dictated by circumstances beyond [their] control,” while a
“tactical collaborator” would have taken the view that “collaboration disguises resistance and is part of the fight.”135 Not all
such claims would constitute recognizable defenses to a criminal charge even if substantiated; although, in the trials of collaborators, such claims were at times taken into consideration
in determining guilt and rendering the appropriate sentence.
Post-war assessments of criminal liability for acts of collaboration have involved claims that such actions were coerced un133. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5, art. 70; Twenty-Eighth Plenary Meeting (August 4, 1949), in 2 FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, 433-434; Thirty-Second Plenary Meeting
(August 6, 1949), in 2 FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF
GENEVA OF 1949, 480.
134. See Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, ¶ 1722, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48, (Sept. 25, 2009);
JEAN PICTET, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION, RELATIVE TO THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 163 (Jean Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans.,
1960); PAUL MCMAHON, BRITISH SPIES AND IRISH REBELS: BRITISH
INTELLIGENCE AND IRELAND 1916-1945 46 (2008).
135. RINGS, supra note 3, at 73.
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der duress or by the necessity of the circumstances. The laws of
armed conflict have long acknowledged the existence of such
defenses, particularly in relation to the activities of informers
and other collaborators. The United States’ Lieber Code of
1863, for example, plainly stated that “[n]o person having been
forced by the enemy to serve as a guide is punishable for having done so.”136 This influential document, comprising a set of
instructions issued to United States forces during the American Civil War, seems to have prompted the Russian delegation
to propose the following provision on guides at the 1874 Brussels Conference:
An inhabitant of a country, who has “voluntarily” served as a
guide to the enemy, is guilty of high treason; he is not, however, liable to punishment from the moment he has been “compelled” by the enemy to serve in such capacity. 137

It was observed at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907
that an individual’s guilt “is not established by any code if his
offence has been committed under the domination of an irresistible compulsion.”138 The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court includes the defenses of duress and necessity,
although these have rarely been used in trials before the various international criminal tribunals.139 The widely accepted
Rome Statute definition provides that criminal responsibility
will not arise where:
The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court has been caused by duress resulting
from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent
serious bodily harm against that person or another person,
and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this
threat, provided that the person does not intend to cause a

136. FRANCIS LIEBER, LIEBER CODE, art. 94, reprinted in INSTRUCTIONS FOR
GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD 29 (1898)
[hereinafter Lieber Code].
137. 1875, Vict., c. 1128, Correspondence Respecting the Proposed Conference at Brussels on the Rules of Military Warfare, 18, 202 (U.K.).
138. FOURTH MEETING OF THE SECOND COMMISSION: FIRST SUBCOMISSION, 31
JULY 1907, in 3 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES: THE
CONFERENCES OF 1907, 133 (1921).
139. Cf. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeals Chamber
(Int’l Crim Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-aj971007e.pdf.
THE
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greater harm than the one sought to be avoided. Such a
threat may either be:
(i) Made by other persons; or
(ii) Constituted by other circumstances beyond that person’s
control.140

In addition to an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the criminal acts engaged in, the element of imminent
threat is central. The International Criminal Court has contended that a duress claim based on a threat of subsequent disciplinary measures, however harsh, would unlikely succeed.141
Although international law readily accepts the defenses of
duress and necessity for international crimes, and states
acknowledge the relevance of these defenses to acts of collaboration during wartime, the admissibility of the defense of duress to charges of treason under national criminal law has been
contested. In England and Wales, according to David Ormerod
and Karl Laird, “it would be wrong to suppose that threats,
even of death, will necessarily be a defense to every act of treason” given the various forms and degrees of seriousness of the
crime.142 Similarly, the United States Manual for CourtsMartial excludes the defense of duress for the offense of “killing
an innocent person,” and for other offenses it requires “a reasonable apprehension that the accused or another innocent
person would immediately be killed or would immediately suffer serious bodily injury if the accused did not commit the
act.”143 The defense was admitted in R v. Purdy, the trial of a
British prisoner of war who had divulged information while detained during the Second World War, engaged in propaganda
for Nazi Germany, and worked as an interpreter for the SS.144
Purdy claimed that he had only been in the service of the SS
because of a threat to carry out a death sentence for espionage
140. Rome Statute, supra note 65, art 31(d).
141. Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/14, Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 152 155 (Mar. 23, 2016) https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02331.PDF.
142. DAVID ORMEROD & KARL LAIRD, SMITH AND HOGAN’S CRIMINAL LAW 406
(14th ed. 2015). See also EIMEAR SPAIN, THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN CRIMINAL
LAW DEFENCES: DURESS, NECESSITY AND LESSERS EVILS 217 20 (2011).
143. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL OF COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES
117 (2016).
144. R. v. Purdy, 10 J. CRIM. L. 182, 182 83 (1946).
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that he had previously received in Germany.145 The judge in
Purdy instructed the jury that they could consider the defense
of duress in relation to this charge: “If you believe, or if you
think that it might be true, that he only did that because he
had the fear of death upon him, then you will acquit him on
that charge because to act in matters of this sort under threat
of death is excusable.”146 Purdy was ultimately found guilty
and sentenced to death, although subsequently reprieved.147
In the Netherlands, post-war cases saw “the plea of duress . .
. less easily accepted,” given the “extended national duties”
that arise for the population of occupied territories in a context
of “total war.”148 Notwithstanding the degree of uncertainty regarding their application to treason or murder, the defenses of
duress and necessity involve exacting standards that are not
always readily met, even by those accused of collaboration with
the enemy under extreme circumstances.
During both the Korean and Vietnam wars, captured United
States prisoners of war cooperated with the opposing side in
various ways, often in the context of highly coercive circumstances involving torture, starvation, and brutal camp conditions.149 Criticized for their selectivity and politicization, United States Army courts-martial for collaboration that were held
after the Korean war had to contend with the defense of duress
and the conditions faced by the accused in Korean camps.150
Over a dozen returnees were charged with aiding the enemy,
which constituted a capital offense,151 although other potential
cases of wrongdoing were not pursued on account of “substan145. Id. at 185.
146. Id. at 186 87.
147. For an account of other cases in the United Kingdom involving duress
see Coercion: A Defense to Misconduct while a Prisoner of War, 29 IND. L. J.
603, 609 10 (1954).
148. Röling, supra note 79, at 436 37.
149. See generally CHARLES S. YOUNG, NAME, RANK, AND SERIAL NUMBER:
EXPLOITING KOREAN WAR POWS AT HOME AND ABROAD (2014); RAYMOND LECH,
BROKEN SOLDIERS (2000); Elizabeth Lutes Hillman, Disloyalty Among Men in
Arms: Korean War POWs at Court-Martial, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1629 (2004).
150. On selectivity and politicization see Lutes Hillman, supra note 149, at
1632, 1643 47; LECH, supra note 149, at 222 26, 254; YOUNG, supra note 149,
at 3, 87, 142, 145 46, 190; See also WINSTON GROOM & DUNCAN SPENCER,
CONVERSATIONS WITH THE ENEMY: THE STORY OF PFC ROBERT GARWOOD
(1983).
151. LECH, supra note 149, at 212 13.
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tial evidence of force or duress.”152 For example, a court-martial
was not recommended for Colonel Frank Schwable, who had
been tortured into signing a confession regarding the United
States’ use of bacteriological warfare, finding: “Colonel Schwable resisted this torture to the limit of his ability to resist [and
he had] reasonable justifications for entering into such acts.”153
The defense of duress only succeeded in one of the courtsmartial, failing in others on account of the absence of immediacy in relation to the threats made of death or ill-treatment.154
While not amounting to duress, “[b]eatings, intensive interrogations, and deprivation of food, water, medical care, and
sleep” could be considered in mitigating the sentence.155 In
United States v. Fleming, the Court of Military Appeals reiterated that duress required “a well-grounded apprehension of
immediate death or serious bodily harm.”156 The majority found
that this standard had not been met, including the threat of
confinement to caves where detained prisoners had died, stating, “Although by civilized standards, conditions in the prisoner
of war camp were deplorable, we cannot conclude, as a matter
of law, that the threat of duress or coercion was so immediate
as to legally justify the accused’s acts.”157 Fleming was discharged from the Army for his propaganda and other activities
that amounted to collaborating, communicating, and holding
intercourse “directly with the enemy.”158 His sentence was at
the lower end of the spectrum of those handed down to the returning prisoners of war. Other prisoners of war received life or
lengthy terms of imprisonment, some with hard labor, reflecting the differing levels of seriousness of the various acts of collaboration.159 It has been said that a public outcry brought
prosecutions to an end and contributed to those found guilty
serving only partial terms.160

152. Misconduct in the Prison Camp: A Survey of the Law and Analysis of
the Korean Cases, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 709, 738 (1956). See also LECH, supra
note 149, at 233, 250; YOUNG, supra note 149, at 3, 147 49.
153. LECH, supra note 149, at 240 41.
154. Misconduct in the Prison Camp, supra note 152, at 769.
155. Id. at 770.
156. United States v. Fleming, 23 C.M.R. 7, 28 (1957).
157. Id. But see Id. at 28 29 (Chief Judge Quinn, Concurring).
158. Id. at 9.
159. YOUNG, supra note 149, at 147; LECH, supra note 149, at 246, 267 74.
160. Id.
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The courts-martial of United States prisoners of war that collaborated during the Korean War also exposed the limited role
of motive in the trials for collaboration. Accused persons have
occasionally argued that they cooperated with the enemy for
benign reasons. Fleming and several others claimed that they
had collaborated in order to save the lives of fellow prisoners of
war or to contribute to peace.161 The Court of Military Appeals
held, however, that “good motives are not a defense to a crime,”
though they may be relevant for determining sentence.162
The post Second World War reckoning with collaborators
was littered with claims that service for the enemy was either
transparently or secretly undertaken for positive reasons. Pétain in France and Quisling in Norway argued unsuccessfully
that they were in some ways shielding their countries from the
Nazis, while lower-ranking defendants often pleaded that they
remained in their posts while under German occupation “to
prevent someone more radical than themselves from taking
over.”163 Peter Novick has traced the argument that collaborators aided the enemy in order “to make the best of a bad situation,” positing:
From Pétain and Laval down to petty officials, industrialists
and journalists, the claim was that by their action they had
prevented greater German exactions. It might be a question of
substituting Gallic anti-Semitic measures for the Endlössung,
keeping factories going to prevent the deportation of their
workers, carrying out bloodless expeditions against the Resistance instead of leaving it to the tender mercies of the
Germans, or simply establishing good relations with the
Germans so that they would be amenable to suggestion. 164

The “double game” argument, that Vichy collaborators were
also working for the Resistance, was valid in certain cases,
though many collaborators joined the Resistance when Germany’s defeat became apparent.165 Although not defenses to a
criminal charge, Jon Elster concludes that during the purges in
post-war France, “such redemptive acts have been allowed to

161. Misconduct in the Prison Camp, supra note 152, at 773 74.
162. United States v. Fleming, 7 C.M.R. at 26 27. See also United States v.
Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. 452, 466 (1955) aff’d, 22 C.M.R. 144 (1956).
163. Deák at al., supra note 19, at 11.
164. NOVICK, supra note 24, at 170.
165. Id. at 88 89, 169 70; DÉAK, supra note 3, at 81, 121 22.
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play a role in the determination of guilt and in sentencing.”166
The political chief of the French automobile industry, François
Lehideux, is said to have successfully defended the charge of
“intelligence with the enemy” by claiming to have actively resisted, rather than collaborated, as “the French automobile industry had systematically sabotaged the German war effort by
deliberately underproducing.”167
Former members of the Jewish Councils or Jewish Police in
occupied territories, as well as those who served as Kapos in
the concentration and extermination camps, received varying
treatment as potential victims of circumstances when tried after the Second World War. In the Soviet Union, for example,
members of the Jewish Councils were sentenced severely, with
little by way of mitigation for those convicted.168 In contrast,
the Jewish Honor Courts that operated in occupied Germany
accepted the relevance of the coercive context and “generally
recognized that the assumption of posts such as a Judenrat
member, ghetto policeman or kapo was not a matter of choice,
[but] they nevertheless regarded the way in which individuals
fulfilled their tasks as a matter of choice for which they could
be held accountable.”169 A number of Kapos were tried in Israel
pursuant to its Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law
of 1950, the drafting of which saw a divergence of views within
the Knesset regarding the availability of duress or necessity as
a defense or mitigation in the trial of Jewish collaborators.170
Of the approximately thirty trials that took place, many accused were acquitted or given relatively light sentences.171
166. Elster, supra note 47, at 324 25 (emphasis in original).
167. TALBOT IMLAY & MARTIN HORN, THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL
COLLABORATION DURING WORLD WAR II: FORD FRANCE, VICHY AND NAZI
GERMANY 1 2 (2014).
168. Penter, supra note 32, at 353 55.
169. Laura Jockusch, Rehabilitating the Past? Jewish Honor Courts in Allied-Occupied Germany, in JEWISH HONOR COURTS: REVENGE, RETRIBUTION,
AND RECONCILIATION IN EUROPE AND ISRAEL AFTER THE HOLOCAUST 49, 64
(Laura Jokusch & Gabriel N. Finder eds., 2015).
170. Dan Porat, Changing Legal Perceptions of “Nazi Collaborators” in Israel, 1950-1972, in JEWISH HONOR COURTS: REVENGE, RETRIBUTION, AND
RECONCILIATION IN EUROPE AND ISRAEL AFTER THE HOLOCAUST 303, 307 08
(Laura Jockusch & Gabriel N. Finder eds., 2015).
171. LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT WRONG MAN: JOHN DEMJANJUK AND
THE LAST GREAT NAZI WAR CRIMES TRIAL 66 (2016). See also Orna Ben-Naftali
& Yogev Tuval, Punishing International Crimes Committed by the Persecuted:
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In one of the last of these cases, a former commander of the
Jewish Police in German occupied territory, Hirsch Berenblat,
had his five year imprisonment sentence set aside by the Supreme Court of Israel, which placed particular emphasis on the
coercive context of his collaboration.172 Chief Justice Olshan
stated that the question of what a Judenrat leader should have
done in the circumstances “is one for history and not for a court
before which a persecuted person is brought to face criminal
charges.”173 Justice Landau noted that the cooperation of the
Jewish Police was “borne of unprecedented duress and force,”
and that it would be hypocritical to criticize those who “did not
rise to the heights of moral supremacy, when mercilessly oppressed.”174 The Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment)
Law of 1950 could not be interpreted “by some moral standard
which only few are capable of reaching.”175 The Supreme
Court’s judgment effectively brought an end to the trials of
Jewish Nazi collaborators and came at a time when they were
increasingly seen by the Israeli public as victims more than
perpetrators.176 The fraught question of Jewish collaborators
was also touched upon in the context of denaturalization proceedings, which are addressed in the next section.
C. Denial of Refugee Status and Revocation of Citizenship
International organizations mandated to work on the issue of
refugees and displaced persons in the aftermath of the Second
World War declared from the outset that war criminals and collaborators were not to benefit from the planned system of protection. In one of its earliest resolutions, the United Nations
General Assembly emphasized “the necessity of clearly distinguishing between genuine refugees and displaced persons, on
the one hand, and war criminals, quislings and traitors . . . on
The Kapo Trials in Israel (1950s-1960s), 4 J. INT. CRIM. JUST. 128, 150, 160
(2006).
172. For an overview see Porat, supra note 170, at 305, 313 18.
173. CrimA 77/64 Hirsch Berenblat v. Attorney General, Supreme Court of
Israel,
18
Legal
Verdicts,
70
(1964)
(Isr.)
available
at
https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Berenblat%20
v.%20Attorney%20General.pdf.
174. Id. at 41.
175. Id.
176. See Porat, supra note 170, at 313 21. On the prosecution of vicimperpetrators see Mark Drumbl, Victims Who Victimise, 4 LONDON REV. INT’L
L. 217 (2016).
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the other.”177 The General Assembly also stressed that any action taken should not interfere with the surrender, prosecution,
and punishment of war criminals and collaborators.178 The constitutive documents of the International Refugee Organization,
the precursor to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, explicitly stated that war criminals,
quislings, and traitors would not be the concern of the Organization.179 Equally excluded were those persons shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of countries, Members of the United Nations; or
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the
outbreak of the second world war in their operations against
the United Nations.180

This language was ambiguous and created some uncertainty,
which resurfaced in deportation cases many decades later.181
The exclusion clause in Article 1(F) of the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees drew on these provisions,
but perhaps in the interests of clarity, omitted any reference to
collaborators. The Refugee Convention protections do not apply
to a person where there are serious reasons to believe that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a
crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such
crimes;
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside
the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as
a refugee;
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations. 182
177. G.A. Res. 8(I) (Feb. 12, 1946).
178. Id. ¶ (d).
179. G.A. Res. 62(I) Constitution of the International Refugee Organization,
annex I, part II, ¶ 1 (Dec. 15, 1946). See further Economic and Social Council,
Rep. of the Special Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons, U.N. Doc.
E/REF/75 (June 7, 1946).
180. G.A. Res. 62(1) at 97 annex I, Part II, ¶ 2 (Dec. 15, 1946).
181. Felice Morgenstern, Asylum for War Criminals, Quislings and Traitors, 25 BRIT. Y. B. INT’L L. 382, 386 (1948).
182. See further GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 97 (2007); Geoff Gilbert, Current Issues in the Application of the Exclusion Clauses, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL
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While not explicitly referred to, collaborators could be excluded
from the protection of the Refugee Convention if their activities
amounted to international crimes.183 Alternatively, service to
an opposing belligerent that did not involve such crimes might
amount to treason, which could be considered a political offense.184 In addition, there is little doubt that wartime collaborators faced serious threats for their activities. There are numerous examples of refugee protection being given to those
that cooperated with an opposing side during an armed conflict.
Following the Second World War, the international community took the stance that suspected war criminals and collaborators were not to benefit from the legal protections afforded to
“genuine refugees,” yet Nazi collaborators successfully sought
refuge outside of Europe and, in some cases, were actively assisted by officials of the Allied Nations. A large number of collaborators were admitted to the United States, some of whom
received assistance from United States officials, and others
were even recruited as spies and informers by the CIA and FBI
during the Cold War.185 Since that time, the United States Department of Justice has undertaken denaturalization proceedings against a number of such individuals on the basis that
they obtained visas under false pretenses. Criminal proceedings could not be taken against such persons on account of the
rule of non-retroactivity, as their alleged crimes did not violate
United States law at the time of their commission.186
LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 426
(Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003).
183. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S 137. See further JOSEPH RIKHOF, THE CRIMINAL REFUGEE: THE
TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS WITH A CRIMINAL BACKGROUND IN
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW (2012); John S. Willems, From Treblinka
to the Killing Fields: Excluding Persecutors from the Definition of “Refugee,”
27 VA. J. INT’L L. 823 (1987).
184. See, e.g. L.C. Green, Political Offences, War Crimes and Extradition, 11
INT’L COMP. L. Q. 329 (1964).
185. See LICHTBLAU, supra note 62; CHRISTOPH SCHIESSEL, ALLEGED NAZI
COLLABORATORS IN THE UNITED STATES AFTER WORLD WAR II (2016); Kevin
Conley Ruffmer, Eagle and Swastika: CIA and Nazi War Criminals and Collaborators, 1, 7 (CIA, working paper, 2003).
186. JUDY FEIGIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIONS: STRIVING FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE
HOLOCAUST 541 (Mark M. Richard ed., 2009); see also Matthew Lippman, The
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Aleksandras Lileikis, the head of Lithuania’s secret police in
Vilnius during the German occupation, faced such denaturalization proceedings. He had been granted entry to the United
States in 1955, but was later found to have acted “in concert
with the Gestapo” in its persecution of Lithuanian Jews.187 The
Central Intelligence Agency sought to prevent his deportation,
though the case eventually proceeded and he was deported to
Lithuania in 1996 to face trial, but died at the age of ninetythree before the verdict was issued.188 A similar denaturalization proceeding failed against Soviet citizen Tscherim Soobzokov, who had joined the SS during the Second World War, because United States officials were aware of his activities when
he was granted entry into the United States.189 Soobzokov subsequently died after a bomb attack on his home that was linked
to a Jewish militant group.190 In all, the Department of Justice
Office of Special Investigations denaturalized and deported
around three dozen Nazi collaborators.191 Canada also revoked
the citizenship of several Nazi collaborators for failing to disclose their activities in support of the Nazis to Canadian authorities, but not necessarily on the basis that they had participated in crimes.192
One of the more famous denaturalization cases in the United
States was that of John Demjanjuk, a Ukrainian national who
had served in the Red Army, but then worked as a guard in a
number of German concentration and extermination camps

Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals in the United States: Is Justice Being
Served?, 7 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 169 (1985).
187. LICHTBLAU, supra note 62, at 213 28.
188. Id. at 222 26. See also Maura Reynolds, Nazi Collaborator Alexandras
Lileikis Dies at 93 in Lithuania, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2000),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2000/09/30/nazi-collaboratoraleksandras-lileikis-dies-at-93-in-lithuania/fd7c4294-4b3b-405d-b40a4a015cd33905/.
189. LICHTBLAU, supra note 62, at 121 23.
190. Id. at 175 79. See also Judith Cummings, F.B.I. Says Jewish Defense
League May Have Planted Fatal Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1985, at A1.
191. DOUGLAS, supra note 171, at 113.
192. See Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Fast, [2003] F.C. 1139,
¶98 (Can.); Kirk Makin & Jane Taber, Ottawa Strips Two Nazi Suspects of
Citizenship,
GLOBE
AND
MAIL
(May
24,
2007),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ottawa-strips-two-nazisuspects-of-citizenship/article20397970/; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Oberlander, [2000] F.C.14968 (Can.).
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while a prisoner of war.193 Demjanjuk was subject to two sets of
denaturalization proceedings in the United States; after the
first, he was deported to Israel, tried and convicted of crimes
against the Jewish people and crimes against humanity, but
subsequently acquitted by the Supreme Court in what was
seemingly a case of mistaken identity.194 Following a second
denaturalization proceeding in the United States, he was deported to Germany where he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to five years imprisonment for being an accessory to the
murder of Jews at the Sobibor extermination camp in Poland.195 Demjanjuk was not a high-ranking or especially prominent individual he has been described as “a run-of-the-mill
auxiliary in the Nazi system of atrocity” but the case was significant, as it offered one of the few examples where Germany
tried non-nationals for their collaboration in the crimes of the
Second World War.196 The defense of duress was also at issue in
the proceedings because Demjanjuk had been recruited into the
Trawnikis, a notorious group of Soviet prisoners of war involved in thousands of murders by the SS.197
During the denaturalization proceedings against Demjanjuk
in the United States, the courts had to address the relevance of
the argument that his service as a concentration camp guard
was involuntary. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that he was ineligible for a visa under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 for having served as a Nazi concentration
camp guard, irrespective of whether such service was voluntary
or involuntary.198 The Act relied upon the definition used in the
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, which
had excluded those who “assisted the enemy in persecuting ci-

193. DOUGLAS, supra note 171, at 15.
194. See Lisa J. del Pizzo, Not Guilty – But Not Innocent: An Analysis of the
Acquittal of John Demjanjuk and its Impact on the Future of Nazi War
Crimes Trials, 18 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 137 (1995).
195. DOUGLAS, supra note 171, at 66 67.
196. Id. at 2, 133. See also RICHARDS PLAVNIEKS, NAZI COLLABORATORS ON
TRIAL DURING THE COLD WAR: VICTOR AR JS AND THE LATVIAN AUXILIARY
SECURITY POLICE 252 (2018).
197. DEÁK, supra note 3, at 72. See Peter Black, Foot Soldiers of the Final
Solution: The Trawniki Training Camp and Operation Reinhard, 25
HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE STUD. 1, 5 (2011).
198. United States v. Demjanjuk, 367 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2004).
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vilian populations” or “voluntarily assisted the enemy forces . .
. in their operations.”199
The question of voluntariness under the Act had previously
been addressed by the Supreme Court in Fedorenko v. United
States, which held that assisting in the persecution of civilians,
such as by serving as a concentration camp guard, rendered
one ineligible for a visa regardless of whether such service was
voluntary or involuntary.200 In that case, Feodor Fedorenko, a
former Soviet citizen of Ukraine, had not disclosed that he had
been an armed guard at the Treblinka extermination camp in
Poland following his capture by the Germans, which would
have rendered him ineligible for a visa or United States citizenship.201 While the District Court had found that Fedorenko
had been forced to serve as a guard, the Supreme Court determined this to be irrelevant under the Displaced Persons Act.202
Supreme Court Justice Stevens dissented, unable to share the
view that “any citizen’s past involuntary conduct can provide
the basis for stripping him of his American citizenship.”203 The
Court’s holding, he argued, would have unacceptably prevented
Kapos from being eligible for citizenship.204
Fedorenko was subsequently deported to the Soviet Union
where, in 1986, he was convicted of treason and murder and
ultimately executed by firing squad.205 Similarly, Demjanjuk
was deported to Germany to face trial after the Supreme Court
found that his entry to the United States was unlawful and his
naturalization “illegally procured.”206 German investigators
had not previously investigated so-called Trawnikis such as
Demjanjuk on the assumption that involuntariness or duress
might successfully be argued as a defense.207 Laurence Douglas
has pointed out that the possibility of desertion from the SS
would undermine such a claim for Demjanjuk: “once he found
himself serving, he chose to stay put, and that choice, even if
199. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1009 § 2 (1948).
200. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981)
201. Id. at 513 14.
202. Id. at 500 01.
203. Id. at 533.
204. Id. at 534 35. See however DOUGLAS, supra note 171, at 48.
205. Nazi Expelled by U.S. Executed: Fyodor Fedorenko Dies by Soviet Firing Squad, L.A. TIMES (July 27, 1987), https://www.latimes.com/archives/laxpm-1987-07-27-mn-4129-story.html.
206. Demjanjuk, 367 F.3d at 637.
207. DOUGLAS, supra note 171, at 224.
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constrained by circumstance, was voluntary. Constrained
choice, after all, is crucially different than no choice whatsoever.”208 Demjanjuk was found guilty as an accessory to the murder of 28,060 Jews at the Sobibor death camp and sentenced to
five years imprisonment, but he was later released pending appeal.209 He died before the appeal was heard.210
The United States Department of Justice was far more hesitant to proceed with denaturalization against Jewish prisoners
alleged to have collaborated with the Nazis, as they could also
be considered victims.211 However, in the case of Jacob Tannenbaum, the infamous Kapo at the Gorlitz concentration
camp, dozens of survivors sought his prosecution and gave accounts of him “brutalizing and physically abusing prisoners,”
even when SS personnel were not present.212 While Tannenbaum claimed that he had acted to save his own life and had
spared the lives of prisoners, he was subject to denaturalization
proceedings, which lead to an agreement that he would give up
his United States citizenship and admit to his abuse of Jewish
prisoners.213 He was allowed to stay in the United States, however, because of his poor health.214 As to the dilemma of victims
that collaborated with their oppressors, Judge Glasser, who sat
in the proceedings, stated:
I dreaded the day when this case was to come to trial . . . I
have often wondered how much moral and physical courage
we have a right to demand or expect of somebody in the position of Mr. Tannenbaum . . . I sometimes wonder whether I
might have passed that test.215

Some of Tannenbaum’s victims were less conciliatory, demanding vengeance, “not compassion or understanding,” and the
same punishment as other Nazis had received.216
The advanced age and ill-health of some Nazi collaborators,
such as Tannenbaum, prevented their deportation, although
208. Id. at 228.
209. Id. at 252 53.
210. Id. at 257.
211. LICHTBLAU, supra note 62, at 196.
212. Robert D. McFadden, A Jew Who Beat Jews in a Nazi Camp Is
Stripped of His Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1988, at B1.
213. FEIGIN, supra note 186, at 106 16.
214. Id. at 112 13.
215. Id. at 112.
216. LICHTBLAU, supra note 62, at 198; FEIGIN, supra note 186, at 112 13.
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the United Nations Human Rights Committee rejected a claim
that revocation proceedings in Canada against a former collaborator would violate the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment.217 Prosecuting
someone in poor health might be incompatible with Article 7 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
Committee held, but “[n]o such circumstances exist in the present case, in which the citizenship revocation proceedings were
provoked by serious allegations that the author participated in
the gravest crimes.”218
After the Second World War, state authorities sought to prevent collaborators from benefiting from refugee protection,
even revoking citizenship entitlements previously granted.
More recently, such authorities have recognized that the risks
faced by persons who have collaborated with a particular side
during an armed conflict can be considered persecution within
the meaning of refugee law. For example, in the context of the
United States led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, the
United Kingdom granted asylum to a number of Iraqis on this
basis. With regard to an Iraqi interpreter who had worked with
United States forces in Mosul, the United Kingdom’s Asylum
and Immigration Tribunal held that:
[A] person who has worked as a translator or in any other
way such as to be regarded by insurgents as a collaborator
with the multi-national force and who has been targeted by a
significant insurgent group, is a person who at present faces a
real risk of persecution on account of perceived political opinion in his home area in Iraq.219

In 2006, the Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia similarly
accepted that the claim by a Palestinian triggered Australia’s
obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention on the basis
that, “if he is forced to return to the occupied territories he will
be at risk of serious harm by Hamas, and other individuals or

217. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Walter Obodzinsky (deceased) and his
daughter Anita Obodzinsky v. Canada, Comm. No. 1124/2002, ¶ 9.2,
CCPR/C/89/D/1124/2002
(Mar.
19,
2007)
available
at
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/600218.
218. Id.
219. NS (Iraq: perceived collaborator: relocation), Iraq CG [2007] UKAIT
00046 ¶ 40 (UK). See also BA (Returns to Baghdad Iraq CG) [2017] UKUT 18
(IAC) (Jan. 23, 2017) (UK).
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groups, because he is suspected of collaborating with the Israeli
authorities.”220
In contrast, a claim for asylum by an Afghan national who
worked as an interpreter at the British embassy in Kabul and
acted as an informer was rejected by the United Kingdom authorities in 2015.221 The collaboration in that instance was considered low-level, with a consequent lower risk of harm from
the Taliban.222 In a separate case, the European Court of Human Rights found that returning two Afghan nationals to Afghanistan, after one had worked as a driver for the United Nations and the other an interpreter for United States forces, did
not violate the European Convention on Human Rights because
the Afghan nationals had not shown that a real risk existed of
a violation of the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment, or punishment under Article 3.223 The United States
authorities have granted asylum to informers not only on account of the serious risks that they would face if returned to
countries such as Palestine, Mexico, or the Philippines, but also
to avoid discouraging others from collaborating when such activities support the United States’ interests.224 Indeed, the
United States has introduced a visa program specifically for
interpreters and translators who assisted its forces in Iraq and
Afghanistan.225 The dogmatic, exclusionary approach of inter220. RRT Case No. 060793720, [2006] RRTA 197, Australia: Refugee Review
Tribunal,
Nov.
21,
2006,
available
at
https://www.refworld.org/cases,AUS_RRT,47a7080bd.html (Austl.).
221. See e.g., Haroon Faizi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number:
AA/05285/2014, ¶ 9 15 (Sept. 16, 2015).
222. Id.
223. Case of H & B v. United Kingdom, App Nos. 70073/10 and 44539/11
¶102 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013).
224. Son of Hamas Founder Granted Asylum in the US, TELEGRAPH (June
30,
2010),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7864876/Sonof-Hamas-founder-granted-asylum-in-US.html; Natasha Mozgovaya, U.S.
Court Grants Asylum to ‘Son of Hamas’, HAARETZ (June 30, 2010),
https://www.haaretz.com/1.5141763; MOSSAB HASSAN YOUSEF, SON OF HAMAS
261 (2014). See also Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder, 574 F.3d 893, 900 01 (8th Cir.
2009); Mejia v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 873, 879 80 (9th Cir. 2002).
225. Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) for Iraqi and Afghan Translators/Interpreters, U.S. Dept. of State
Bureau of Consular Affairs,
https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/immigrate/iraqi-afghantranslator.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). See further Ben Juvinall, Heaven
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national refugee law towards collaborators of the post Second
World War period has given way to the recognition that such
individuals may require protection on account of their wartime
activities.
II. RECONSTRUCTION, REHABILITATION AND RECONCILIATION
In a post-conflict context, it might be neither possible nor desirable to meet popular demands for revenge, retribution, and
punishment of collaborators. This is particularly the case
where retaliation in kind is called for or where a criminal justice system lacks sufficient capacity. Criminal trials are without doubt an important means of accountability and justice in
the aftermath of armed conflict, but they may also suffer from
“inherent limitations” in effectively coming to terms with the
past.226 Authorities may choose to pursue other options alongside trials that are aimed at reconstructing society and restoring the status quo through rehabilitating and reintegrating
combatants and collaborators into society. Following the Second World War, for example, most Western European countries
“made great efforts to rehabilitate the condemned collaborators, in part so as to relieve overcrowding in the prisons, in part
to increase the workforce.”227
As explored in the following sections, states have also resorted to transitional justice mechanisms other than criminal trials
and lustration to address past collaboration with an opposing
side during armed conflict. The first part of this section considers the use of amnesty in relation to wartime collaborators and
explores how this contested instrument may exclude potential
beneficiaries if they have engaged in especially serious crimes.
The second part looks at how truth commissions have engaged
with the phenomenon of collaboration. The published reports of
various commissions have contributed to establishing the
truth, contextualizing the phenomenon of collaboration during
armed conflict, and making recommendations for addressing
both the activities of collaborators and the stigma they may
face. More so than criminal justice processes, such bodies have
or Hell? The Plight of Wartime Interpreters of the Iraq and Afghanistan Conflicts living in the U.S., 21 MICH. STATE INT’L L. REV. 205 (2013).
226. Rep. of the S.C., at ¶¶ 39, 47, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (2004).
227. DEÁK, supra note 3, at 204. See also Helen Grevers, Re-education in
Times of Transitional Justice: the Case of the Dutch and Belgian Collaborators After the Second World War, 22 EUR. REV. HIST. 711 (2015).
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addressed accountability with a view to advancing rehabilitation and reconciliation in the interests of societal reconstruction.
A. Amnesty
The granting of amnesty is a common, if controversial, means
of dealing with those who may have participated in hostilities
and engaged in unlawful conduct during an armed conflict.
Mark Freeman defines amnesty as:
an extraordinary legal measure whose primary function is to
remove the prospects and consequences of criminal liability
for designated individuals or classes of persons in respect of
designated types of offences irrespective of whether the persons concerned have been tried for such offences in a court of
law.228

Amnesties may come about because of a political agreement
between parties to a conflict, may be necessary because of the
inability of a justice system to process accused persons, or may
be considered an appropriate mechanism for reintegrating conflict participants into society. Additional Protocol II to the 1949
Geneva Conventions contains one of the few references to amnesty in an international treaty, suggesting that once hostilities in a non-international armed conflict are over, “the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible
amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict.”229
The controversy associated with amnesties is that they may
allow impunity, as persons implicated in serious crimes may
evade criminal responsibility.230 International courts and human rights bodies are increasingly of the view that amnesty for
international crimes including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes is contrary to international law.231
Though such a stance is not supported by customary interna-

228. FREEMAN, supra note 11, at 13.
229. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
art. 6(5), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
230. See, e.g. Orentlicher, supra note 11.
231. See, e.g. Margu v. Croatia, App no 4555/10 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 74(2012);
Barrios Altos v. Peru Case 10.480 ¶ 52 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Mar. 14, 2001).
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tional law,232 it has little bearing on amnesty for domestic offenses, such as sedition or treason, that do not amount to international crimes. Amnesty for wartime collaboration would
generally not be problematic from an international law perspective unless such activities involved complicity in international crimes, although a failure to prosecute even domestic offenses may not satisfy post-conflict demands for justice and accountability at times.
Amnesty has served as a tool both for recruiting informers or
other collaborators during armed conflict and for addressing
their activities following the end of conflict. The 2015 United
States Law of War Manual considers amnesty as an inducement that could be used “to gain the cooperation of captured
enemy persons.”233 In Northern Ireland, the Irish Republican
Army occasionally claimed to grant amnesty to informers who
confessed to their actions, with the motive being to encourage
informers to cease cooperating with the police, the British army, or security forces in Northern Ireland.234
At the end of an armed conflict, it would seem appropriate
that collaborators who were coerced into serving the enemy, or
whose collaboration was minimal in nature, should benefit
from amnesty. The 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement contemplated amnesty for the Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip village of Dahaniya, many of whom had collaborated with Israeli
authorities during its occupation, which commenced in 1967.235
For serious acts of collaboration, parties have also supported
amnesty, even for high-ranking individuals; the Lieber Code

232. See generally FREEMAN, supra note 11; MALLINDER, supra note 11;
VERA VRIEZEN, AMNESTY JUSTIFIED? THE NEED FOR A CASE BY CASE APPROACH
IN THE INTERESTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 52 (2012); Azanian People’s Org. (AZAPO)
and others v. Pres. of the Rep. of South Afr. and others 1996 (8) BCLR 1015
(CC) ¶4 (S. Afr.).
233. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1057.
234. See Dudai, supra note 13, at 35; Ron Dudai, Underground Penality:
The IRA’s Punishment of Informers, 20 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 375 (2018);
Kiran Sarma, Informers and the Battle Against Republican Terrorism: A Review of 30 Years of Conflict, 6 POLICE PRACT. & RES. 165, 175 76 (2005).
235. Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area Annex I, art. IV(5)(6),
May 4, 1994, Isr.-Palestinian Liberation Organization, 33 I.L.M. 622 Annex I:
Protocol Concerning Withdrawal of Israeli Forces and Security Agreement,
Article IV(5)(6).
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contemplated the trial of rebel leaders for high treason “unless
they are included in a general amnesty.”236
After the Second World War, distinctions were drawn between those who had collaborated with the German authorities
in violation of their national laws of allegiance and those that
did so while also engaging in serious violent crimes. The latter
were often not covered by an applicable amnesty; a 1946 Italian
Presidential Decree, for example, included an amnesty for “collaboration with the occupying Germans,” but excluded persons
who were complicit in serious crimes, such as large scale murders.237 In the Tossani case, in which an Italian national successfully appealed his conviction for collaborating with the enemy and was found to warrant amnesty, Italy’s Supreme Court
of Cassation determined that he had only a passive role in an
operation that saw a partisan murdered by German forces.238
The Philippines’ 1948 Presidential Proclamation on Amnesty
adopted a similar, but somewhat ambiguous, distinction. It
granted “full and complete amnesty to all persons accused of
any offense against the national security for acts allegedly
committed to give aid and comfort to the enemy during the last
war,” but also stated that the amnesty would not apply to:
persons accused of treason for having taken up arms against
the allied nations or members of the resistance forces, for having voluntarily acted as spies or informers of the enemy, or for
having committed murder, arson, coercion, robbery, physical
injuries or any other crime against person or property, for the
purpose of aiding and abetting the enemy in the war against
the allied nations or in the suppression of the resistance
movement in the Philippines.239

Those who had traded with the enemy or engaged in bureaucratic collaboration were entitled to amnesty on the basis that
the post-war prosecutions for the former had not been successful and that the latter had either been coerced or undertaken

236. Lieber Code, supra note 136, art. 154.
237. Presidential Decree No. 4 of 22 June 1946, cited in Prosecutor v Tadi ,
Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, ¶ 217 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
238. See also Tossani Case, Italian Court of Cassation, Criminal Section II,
Judgment of 17 September 1946, no. 1446 reprinted in 5 J. INT. CRIM. JUST.
230, 230 (2007).
239. A Proclamation Granting Amnesty, Proc. No. 51, (1948) (Phil.).
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out of a sense of patriotic duty in order to minimize the atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese occupying authorities.240
Amnesty has, at times, followed the trials of collaborators.
After the Bangladesh War of Independence, the newly created
state passed the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals)
Order 1972 and tried thousands of local collaborators for criminal offenses, including murder, rape, and arson, that had been
committed alongside those of Pakistani troops.241 Many of those
convicted of less serious offenses, however, benefited from acts
of clemency and amnesty within a couple of years.242
Wartime collaborators have at times enjoyed de facto amnesty, where prosecutions were not pursued or sentences enforced
for political or economic reasons.243 In Greece, for example,
British authorities prevented the prosecution of Nazi collaborators after the war in order to weaken the Greek communists
who had provided significant resistance to the German occupation.244 De jure amnesty, in contrast, has at times been applied
to collaborators accused of serious crimes in order to foster national unity, rebuild war-torn societies, or temper the severity
of post-war purges.245 Even where amnesty may have formally
excluded serious crimes, in practice its application has often
been arbitrary and inconsistent. The Soviet Union passed an
amnesty law in 1955 for Soviet citizens that had collaborated
with the Germans, but excluded those individuals who had
been convicted of murder and torture, while German nationals including those found responsible for crimes against humanity were given amnesty and repatriated to Germany.246
240. See further DAVID JOEL STEINBERG, PHILIPPINE COLLABORATION IN
WORLD WAR II (1967); Konrad M. Lawson, Between Postoccupation and Postcolonial: Framing the Recent Past in the Philippine Treason Amnesty Debate,
1948, in DEBATING COLLABORATION AND COMPLICITY IN WAR CRIMES TRIALS IN
ASIA, 1945 1956 105 (Kerstin von Lingen ed., 2017).
241. ALIMUZZAMAN
CHOUDHURY,
BANGL.
COLLABORATORS
(SPECIAL
TRIBUNALS) ORDER 1972 (Bangladesh Law Foundation 1972); CAITLIN REIGER,
INT’L. CENTRE FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., FIGHTING PAST IMPUNITY IN
BANGLADESH: A NATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR CRIMES OF 1971 3 4 (2010).
242. REIGER, supra note 241, at 3 4.
243. See HASTINGS, supra note 33, at 144; Penter, supra note 32, at 353.
244. MALLINDER, supra note 11, at 61. See also Ed Vulliamy & Helena
Smith, Athens 1944; Britain’s Dirty Secret, GUARDIAN (Nov. 30 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/30/athens-1944-britains-dirtysecret.
245. MALLINDER, supra note 11, at 49, 58, 86-87, 190.
246. Penter, supra note 32, at 356 57.
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More recent practice has seen political agreements set aside
that were previously committed to the enactment of amnesty,
even for collaborators. The Lomé Accord, for example, provided
that the Government of Sierra Leone would grant “absolute
and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives.”247 The Government thereafter established the Special
Court for Sierra Leone pursuant to an agreement with the
United Nations to try members of various groups for crimes
committed during the conflict, with the Court holding that the
amnesty provision of the Lomé Accord did not deprive it of jurisdiction.248
Amnesty can play a beneficial role as a post-conflict tool that
allows authorities to select individuals or groups that should
not be subject to criminal sanctions and provide relief for an
overburdened criminal justice system. If amnesty is granted, it
is reasonable to apply such a form of quasi-exoneration to those
that may have engaged in low-level collaboration to accommodate the enemy, rather than advance the enemy’s aims and objectives as well as those coerced into collaboration. For more
serious forms of willful collaboration, authorities may accede to
demands for criminal prosecution, particularly of prominent
individuals, even though some discretion for granting amnesty
remains to the extent that such actors were involved in the
commission of crimes recognized by international law.
Although distinct from amnesty, pardons have occasionally
been given for historic convictions for treason, such as those
occurring during and after the Second World War.249 Amnesty
can be a blunt tool in a post-conflict context, the use of which
may be resisted owing to the perception that it effectively al247. Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Article IX, U.N. Doc. S/1999/777
(1999) available at https://peacemaker.un.org/sierraleone-lome-agreement99.
248. Prosecutor v. Kallon and Kamara, Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E)
and SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), Appeals Chamber, Decision on Challenge to
Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, ¶ 88 (Mar. 13, 2004).
249. See Tristina Moore, Nazi deserter hails long-awaited triumph, BBC
NEWS (Sept. 8, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8244186.stm; Charles
Hawley, Germany considers rehabilitating soldiers executed for ‘treason’, DER
SPIEGEL
(June
29,
2007),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/overturning-hitler-s-militarytribunals-germany-considers-rehabilitating-soldiers-executed-for-treason-a491332.html.
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lows for impunity for both perpetrators and those that served
the enemy. The granting of selective amnesty in relation to
wartime collaboration should not be discounted, however, as it
may offer a vehicle for distinguishing between various forms
and differing degrees of collaboration not all of which may
merit exposure to criminal prosecution and punishment.
B. Truth Commissions
In recent decades, states have increasingly resorted to establishing truth commissions in the aftermath of armed conflict or
periods of repression.250 Such bodies may provide a forum for
truth-telling by victims and perpetrators, and their reports can
“expose patterns of violations, raise awareness about the rights
of victims and offer road maps for reform.”251 Despite the prevalence of collaboration during situations of armed conflict, truth
commissions have only occasionally addressed the phenomenon
in detail. Truth commission reports that have dealt with collaboration and its consequences can serve to establish facts regarding such practices and clarify the responsibility of implicated parties and individuals. Such reports have included
analyses of the lawfulness of the trial and treatment of collaborators, as well as recommendations concerning reparations and
the rehabilitation of former collaborators. The processes and
outcomes associated with truth commissions provide opportunities for a richer exposition of the practice of collaboration, the
motivations of individual collaborators, and the consequences
of the phenomenon for them and for society as a whole.
Truth commissions have often addressed collaboration in only
a cursory fashion, by providing brief descriptions of the practice, alluding to the purposes for which of collaborators were
used by parties to a conflict, and outlining the treatment meted
out to individuals. For example, following the civil war from
1979 to 1992, the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador referred to the national army’s counter-insurgency strategy that
entailed “cutting the guerillas lifeline,” whereby local inhabitants in certain areas “were automatically suspected of belonging to the guerilla movement or collaborating with it and thus
250. See generally HAYNER, supra note 12; FREEMAN, supra note 12; ALISON
BISSET, TRUTH COMMISSION AND CRIMINAL COURTS (2012); ONUR BAKINER,
TRUTH COMMISSIONS: MEMORY, POWER AND LEGITIMACY (2016).
251. Rep. of the S.C., ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. S/2011/634 (2011).

122

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 45:1

ran the risk of being eliminated.”252 The Commission’s report
described the FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional) practice of executing suspected spies or traitors
without due process.253 With regard to the organization’s claim
that the killing of a particular individual was “a legitimate execution, since he was a traitor who was contributing in a direct
and effective manner to repression against FMLN,” the Commission held that “international humanitarian law does not
permit the execution of civilians without a proper trial.”254
Guatemala’s Commission for Historical Clarification referred
to enforced disappearances by state agents of those “under suspicion of collaborating with the enemy,” while guerrilla groups
also executed persons “in reprisal for collaboration with the
Army” during the civil war from 1962 to 1996.255 During the
civil war in Liberia from 1999 to 2003, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission reported women were frequently abducted
and mistreated after having been accused of being enemy
spies.256 Such reports can provide official, or at least authoritative, acknowledgment of the often covert use of informers or
other collaborators, as well as assign responsibility for such activity and its consequences.
Truth commissions have also looked at the use of informers
and other collaborators by state security services and opposition groups outside of the context of armed conflict. Nunca
Más, the report of the National Commission on the Disappeared People, described the practice in Argentina whereby
“the authorities managed to obtain, through torture, various
forms of collaboration” by prisoners in many of the large detention centers.257 The Commission described how such individuals were compelled to identify other members of political
groups, participate in torture, and were themselves frequently
disappeared.258 The Chilean National Commission on Truth
252. Rep. of the Comm’n on the Truth for El Salvador, From Madness to
Hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador, at 44, UN Doc. S/25500, (April 1, 1993).
253. Id. at 44, 150.
254. Id. at 162 63.
255. COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, GUATEMALA MEMORY OF SILENCE 35, 42 (1999).
256. See, e.g., 2 REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION, CONSOLIDATED FINAL REPORT 169 (2009).
257. ARGENTINA’S NATIONAL COMMISSION ON DISAPPEARED PEOPLE, NUNCA
MÁS (NEVER AGAIN) 72 (1986).
258. Id. at 72 75.

2019]

Coming to Terms with Wartime Collaboration

123

and Reconciliation described how the functioning of the state’s
intelligence service operated secretively, above the law, and
was generally “destructive of human rights.”259 It established a
“network of collaborators and informers in government agencies” and amongst the prison population, and its staff were
found to have killed suspected traitors within their own
ranks.260 Such reports strongly suggest the inevitability of human rights violations occurring in the recruitment, use, and
treatment of informers and collaborators.
Truth commissions in Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, South Korea, and South Africa have also provided thorough examinations of the employment and treatment of informers and other
collaborators in times of conflict. The report of the Timor-Leste
Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation describes
how, during the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, the Indonesian military developed far-reaching informer networks,
and the information shared by those informers often led to extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, and other serious human
rights violations by the military and by informers themselves.261 At the beginning of the occupation, there was “an atmosphere of uncontrolled fear and vicious resentment towards
those regarded as actual or potential collaborators with the invaders.”262 The Indonesian armed forces relied on civil defense
organizations and local militias during the occupation, with
which it “collaborated in implementing a strategy of mass violence across the territory.”263 The majority of killings and other
violations reported to the Commission were attributed to the
Indonesian military and its so-called “Timorese Collaborators.”264
259. REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION 615 17 (1993).
260. Id. at 618 21, 650.
261. See generally 1 4 THE TIMOR-LESTE COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION,
TRUTH, AND RECONCILIATION, THE FINAL REPORT (2013). See generally
Dominique Le Touze et al., Can There Be Healing Without Justice? Lessons
from the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor,
3 INTERVENTION 192 (2005); Simon Robins, Challenging the Therapeutic Ethic: A Victim-Centred Evaluation of Transitional Justice Process in TimorLeste, 6 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 83 (2012).
262. 2 THE TIMOR-LESTE COMMISSION, supra note 261, at 1120.
263. 1 THE TIMOR-LESTE COMMISSION, supra note 261, at 299; 3 THE TIMORLESTE COMMISSION, supra note 261, at 1631.
264. 1 THE TIMOR-LESTE COMMISSION, supra note 261, at 510, 534.
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The Timor-Leste Commission described how the proindependence groups Fretilin and Falintil mistreated and
killed individuals suspected of being traitors; in one incident,
five people were forced to dig their own graves in the shape of a
T for traitor (traidor), before being killed.265 During the 1990s,
most of the extrajudicial executions carried out by Falintil were
“targeted against collaborators or civilians working as spies for
the Indonesian military.”266 The Commission faced challenges
in comprehensively determining the truth in the context of
such killings:
The Commission received abundant testimonies about the execution or death perpetrated in other ways of people accused
of being [Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia] spies.
Many of these cases are difficult to assess, although the dates
and places in which they occurred sometimes suggest that
they may have been related to internal political conflicts within Fretilin. However, it is also often evident that people were
accused of being in contact with the Indonesians when they
simply wanted to surrender or were engaged in innocent contact with friends or relatives in Indonesian-controlled areas.267

In some cases, those killed were “clearly collaborating with Indonesians,” but the system of “popular justice” used by Fretilin
to try alleged traitors was found by the Commission to be arbitrary and lacking due process.268 Homes of suspected collaborators were often burned “as a warning to the rest of the community about the consequences of collaboration.”269 The report of
the Commission also described how instances of defection from
the Indonesian-supported militias to pro-independence groups
often led to executions and forced displacement by the Indonesian armed forces.270
The Timor-Leste Commission also broached the issue of attribution of responsibility to various actors for crimes commit265. 2 THE TIMOR-LESTE COMMISSION, supra note 261, at 925 27.
266. Id. at 1054 55.
267. Id. at 930 31.
268. Id. at 936; 3 THE TIMOR-LESTE COMMISSION, supra note 261, at 1446
56.
269. 2 THE TIMOR-LESTE COMMISSION, supra note 261, at 1050.
270. 1 THE TIMOR-LESTE COMMISSION, supra note 261, at 245 46, 254 55,
371; 2 THE TIMOR-LESTE COMMISSION, supra note 261, at 970, 978 979, 1129
1130, 1291; 4 THE TIMOR-LESTE COMMISSION, supra note 261, at 2284.
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ted by or against collaborators and made recommendations on
how to address this past violence. In relation to the killing and
mistreatment of suspected collaborators by Fretilin and Falintil, the Commission described these as violations of the laws of
war, specifically Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.271 The Commission recognized the need to take further
measures to address collaboration and its consequences; in his
testimony, Mari Alkatiri, Secretary-General of Fretilin and
Prime Minister of Timor-Leste, acknowledged that the treatment of alleged collaborators has not been adequately dealt
with:
Fretilin as an organisation must take responsibility . . . and I
do not run away from this. . . . When I hear people who come
to me say “my brother, my father, my family was killed by
Fretilin who accused them of being traitors. Are we now traitors or not? We want to know this.” When we hear this . . . we
know that we need to resolve this, that it cannot go on like
this.272

The Commission itself could only go so far in clarifying the
facts in individual cases, but its work identified the need for
parties to the conflict to take further steps in order to clarify
what happened in particular instances.
With regard to rehabilitation and reconciliation, the Community Reconciliation Process in Timor-Leste was designed to assist with the reception and reintegration of persons implicated
in acts connected with the conflict; the Commission believed
this would be an appropriate means of addressing non-criminal
acts that caused harm, such as informing or other methods of
collaboration.273 Members of militias and other collaborators
who made statements before the Community Reconciliation
Process regarding their activities, including pleas for recognition of their having acted under duress, could be questioned by
victims as to the veracity of their claims.274 One collaborator
explained that he had participated in the beating of an individual in order to protect himself from being killed. For the Commission, this case illustrated:
271. 3 THE TIMOR-LESTE COMMISSION, supra note 261, at 1720, 1773 74; 4
THE TIMOR-LESTE COMMISSION, supra note 261, at 2269 70.
272. 4 THE TIMOR-LESTE COMMISSION, supra note 261, at 2330.
273. Id. at 2439.
274. Id. at 2469.
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how “perpetrator” and “victim” are often inadequate terms to
describe the complex roles which individuals played during
the political conflicts. One of the positive attributes of the
[Community Reconciliation Process] was its capacity to expose and clarify these complexities, so that the participating
community was able to gain a fuller understanding of what
had taken place.275

In addition to the widest possible dissemination of its report,
the Commission made various recommendations of relevance to
collaboration and its consequences. This included individual
and collective reparations, memorialization, searching for the
disappeared, rehabilitation of victims, public education, regulation and oversight of security and intelligence services, investigation and prosecution of serious crimes, the establishment of
reconciliation processes, and the release of Indonesian military
and intelligence records relating to Timor-Leste.276
The report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation
Commission corroborates the findings of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone of the “gruesome repercussions of collaborating”
that were evident throughout the civil war.277 The Commission
also highlighted the elasticity of the term collaboration and the
broad understanding given to it by parties to the conflict, as
well as its frequent deployment as a pretext for abusive conduct. While there were examples of civilians directly supporting the activities of parties to the conflict, such as by engaging
in intelligence gathering, the Commission found that, in general, “[t]he notion of collaboration’ was often applied subjectively and arbitrarily by those who used it. It spread fear and
suspicion. Collaboration’ often became a premise upon which
violations and abuses were carried out.”278 Almost all parties to
275. Id. at 2469 70.
276. Id. at 2573 2623.
277. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial
Chamber I, Judgment, ¶ 1125 (2009). On the truth commssion see generally
Tim Kelsall, Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 361 (2005); Beth
K. Dougherty, Searching for Answers: Sierra Leone’s Truth & Reconciliation
Commission, 8 AFR. STUD. Q. 39 (2004).
278. 3A SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, WITNESS TO
TRUTH: REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
303, 315 (2004); 3B SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION,
WITNESS TO TRUTH: REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION 286 (2004).
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the conflict, as well as civilian mobs, engaged in severe violence
against persons labeled as “collaborators.”279
Extrajudicial executions constituted violations of international human rights law and Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, “[r]egardless of the veracity of the allegation or indeed the guilt’ or innocence’ of the supposed collaborator.”280 The Commission found a broader trend relating to
such summary justice, showing that “armed combatants of all
factions acted hastily and violently to eliminate an enemy’
whom they did not know for certain was an enemy.”281 The role
of the Attorney General in issuing a letter to security forces entitled “Present Position relating to the Collaborators of the
AFRC Junta” was singled out for particular criticism by the
Commission:
The letter was open to wide interpretation and consequently
may have led to abuse on the ground. The Attorney-General
appeared to have created a new category of criminal known as
a “collaborator” and sought to have all persons falling into
that category detained in the custody of the state. This new
category was not codified in law but it served to “criminalize”
thousands of Sierra Leoneans.282

The conflict in Sierra Leone saw civilians collaborate with parties to the conflict in various ways, including as perpetrators of
serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law.283
Nonetheless, the term collaboration was usually deployed in
ways which rendered it almost meaningless. It often covered
those only tenuously associated with parties to the conflict, or
not at all, and was employed arbitrarily and without distinction in order to justify repression and criminal violence.
Significantly, the Commission uniquely offered a gender perspective on the practice of collaboration and its consequences
279. 2 SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, WITNESS TO
TRUTH: REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
51, 56, 70, 76, 78, 84, 88 (2004); 3A SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION, supra note 278, at 196, 199, 301, 484, 502.
280. 3A SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, supra note
278, at 555 56.
281. Id. at 199.
282. Id. at 303 04.
283. 1 SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, WITNESS TO
TRUTH: REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
202 25 (2004).
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during the conflict in Sierra Leone, providing a distinctive examination of the impact of the phenomenon on women. While
most women were victims during the conflict, some women participated as perpetrators or engaged in various “collaborative
roles,” such as acting as spies after establishing relationships
with soldiers.284 The Commission recognized that women took
on such roles “out of personal conviction or simply in order to
survive.”285 According to the Commission’s report:
Collaboration in war is often a result of the fact that women
actively work to improve their situation and thus effectively
support the efforts of one or the other side. Many conflicts, including the Sierra Leonean conflict, have arisen as a result of
socio-economic inequalities, so it is not surprising that women
become collaborators in order to survive.286

Rape and other forms of sexual violence were perpetrated
against women that were considered collaborators for having
“associated with” parties to the armed conflict.287 During the
conflict, women and girls were killed, assaulted, and held “under the most cruel and inhuman conditions with the intention
of violating them by raping them and exploiting them as sexual
slaves.”288
The consequences of real or perceived collaboration by women
during the conflict were also evident after the conflict, with the
risk of further stigma and ostracization from society. This limited the ability of the Commission to hear from such women:
Women who have come forward to the TRC have testified
about their own anguish at being identified, ostracized and
mocked, or at being made social outcasts for having been associated with the armed factions. This plight stands to be
compared to the relative ease with which many of their male
counterparts have been accepted back in society. The Commission finds that women in Sierra Leone have had no option
284. 3B SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, supra note
278, at 87, 186 91.
285. Id. at 87.
286. Id. at 191.
287. 2 SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, supra note
279, at 101; 3B SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, supra
note 278, at 177, 180.
288. 2 SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, supra note
279, at 101. See further CHRIS COULTER, BUSH WIVES AND GIRL SOLDIERS:
WOMEN’S LIVES THROUGH WAR AND PEACE IN SIERRA LEONE (2009).
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other than to bury their past so as to be accepted back into society.289

While the Commission had to conclude that the story of female
perpetrators and collaborators in Sierra Leone “has not been
told in its entirety,”290 its report has provided a valuable account and analysis of the specific impact collaboration during
armed conflict has on women.
Most truth commissions have only touched on the distant
past, focusing in greater detail on the more recent past, but the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the Republic of Korea
was tasked with examining almost a century of Korean history
when it was established in 2005.291 This Commission addressed
examples of collaboration and its consequences, including that
by Koreans with the Japanese occupiers during the Second
World War and the extrajudicial execution of South Korean civilians suspected of having collaborated with North Korean
forces during the Korean War. The failure to address the former was considered an impediment to democracy292 and was
also addressed by a series of more narrowly focused Commissions, the first of which was established in 1948 to investigate
and punish collaborators while a more recent Commission set
up in 2006 confiscated the property of collaborators.293 With
regard to the latter episode of collaboration, the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission observed that:
As South Korean forces regained their territory, they killed
their own civilians after accusing them of “collaborating with
289. 3B SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, supra note
278, at 191.
290. Id. See further Chris Mahony & Yasmin Sooka, The Truth about the
Truth: Insider Reflections on the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in EVALUATION TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: ACCOUNTABILITY AND
PEACEBUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT SIERRA LEONE 35 (Kirsten Ainley et al. eds.,
2015).
291. For an overview of the Commission’s mandate and operation see
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION; ACTIVITIES OF THE PAST THREE YEARS 13 21 (2009),
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/ROL/South_Korea_2005_reportEnglis
h.pdf. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report was published
in 2010 in Korean. Id.
292. Id. at 5.
293. See Hun Joon Kim, Transitional Justice in South Korea, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 229, 238 40 (Renée Jeffery & Hun
Joon Kim eds., 2013).
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the enemy” during North Korea’s occupation of South Korean
territory. However, the South Korean military, police, and
right-wing groups ignored judicial procedures during the executions. The victims were never given a trial, an official accusation, or even a reason for their execution. . . . The families of
the victims, afraid of being stigmatized as communists, remained quiet. However, due to Korea’s recent democratic progress, these families have finally spoken after nearly sixty
years of silence.294

The families aimed to “correct the distorted history” and “restore honor to the victims and survivors by rectifying the distorted history that buried the truth of these massacres.”295
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission noted how alleged
collaborators were “illegally executed without clear legal
grounds or criteria,” and that some killings were the result of
personal vendettas or disputes.296 In relation to specific massacres of alleged collaborators, the Commission recommended
that the Korean government make an official apology, support
memorial services for the victims, and provide “peace and human rights education” for the military, police, and civil service.297 The Commission viewed such killings as crimes against
humanity and noted the enduring stigma of being labeled a collaborator: “[t]he victims’ pain and suffering were subsequently
passed down to their descendants who faced various forms of
social discrimination and prejudice.”298
Stigmatization and other consequences of being labeled a collaborator were examined in greater depth by the South Africa
Truth and Reconciliation Commission.299 The Commission provided an account of the widespread use of informers and collaborators in apartheid South Africa, as well as the regular killing
and mistreatment of those considered or falsely accused of be-

294. TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA,
supra note 291, at 7.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 68.
297. Id. at 70 78.
298. Id. at 76.
299. See generally ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH
AFRICA’S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (2000); COMMISSIONING THE
PAST: UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA’S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION (Deborah Posel & Graeme Simpson eds., 2002).
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ing such traitors.300 These acts amounted to gross violations of
human rights, with the killings of collaborators labeled by the
Commission as grave breaches and war crimes under the 1949
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I.301 Informers
were not legitimate targets in the view of the Commission,
even though violence against them could be considered a political act for which amnesty could be sought from the Commission.302 The examination of patterns of human rights abuses by
the Commission allowed it to conclude that the “violations associated with the liberation and mass democratic movements in
the 1980s were not, in the main, the result of armed actions
and sabotage, but tended to target those perceived to be collaborating with the policies and practices of the former government.”303 With regard to “necklacing” as a particularly brutal
form of killing, the Commission described the rationale behind
the use of this technique against suspected informers and collaborators:
From evidence before the Commission, it appears that the
burning of a body was a sign of contempt for the victim and
his/her deeds. No act could convey a deeper sense of hatred
and disrespect. The practice was also used to make an example of the victim, so that others would be inhibited from behaving like the deceased.304

300. See e.g. 1 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S. AFR., TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 90 (1998); 2 TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S. AFR., TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, 10 13, 30, 33, 37, 83 84, 98, 105, 114, 127, 131,
236, 242 45, 257, 295, 300, 309 10, 326, 328, 335 37, 339, 345 46, 376, 379,
386 90, 562, 566 71, 581 82 (1998).
301. 6 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S. AFR., TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, 649, 652 (1998). For a
discussion of the applicability of treaty and customary international humanitarian law in South Africa see id. at 597 602.
302. 6 THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, supra
note 301, at 379, 431, 706 07. There were also attempts by former informers
to seek amnesty, see id. at 232 34. See generally ANTJE DU BOIS-PEDAIN,
TRANSITIONAL AMNESTY IN SOUTH AFRICA (2007); James L. Gibson, Truth, Justice and Reconciliation: Judging the Fairness of Amnesty in South Africa, 46
AM. J. POL. SCI. 540 (2002).
303. 2 THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, supra
note 300, at 9.
304. Id. at 386 88.
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The Commission considered that the state bore responsibility
for fostering paranoia in communities through the use of informers, which in turn led to a climate where violence of this
nature became common.305
Informers also engaged in criminal activity, such as so-called
“credibility operations” involving property destruction and violence undertaken in order to maintain their cover.306 The Truth
and Reconciliation Commission also found that there were security service informers within media organizations, and that
“[h]undreds and probably thousands of South African private
sector companies made the decision to collaborate actively with
the government’s war machine.”307
The South African government’s widespread and systematic
use of informers was a deliberate strategy aimed at suppressing communities and undermining resistance efforts; for the
Commission, this was “highly effective in creating a climate of
suspicion and breaking down trust both within and between
families and communities.”308 The state was able to recruit informers and collaborators through torture and the manipulation of communities that were suffering from poverty and unemployment.309 Records relating to the apartheid regime’s informer networks were deliberately destroyed, according to the
Commission.310 As to the impact of collaboration on individuals,
the Commission observed that:
The consequences of being exposed as an informer were social
isolation and, sometimes, physical danger. Communities were
constantly on guard against informers in their midst. Moreover, being falsely accused could have extremely distressing
consequences for the affected person and his or her family. 311

The stigma attached to real or imagined collaboration in South
Africa was profound:

305. 3 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S. AFR., TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 667 68 (1998).
306. Id. at 171, 628.
307. 4 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N OF S. AFR., TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 49-50, 184 85 (1998).
308. 5 THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, supra
note 14, at 147.
309. Id. at 160.
310. Id. at 203.
311. Id. at 147.
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In this complicated process of conflict and pain, the Commission often became aware that one of the most destructive legacies of the past is the labelling of sometimes innocent people
as “informers” or collaborators. Individuals and their families
were killed, assaulted, harassed and ostracised as a result of
this stigmatisation. Many people still live with the daily experience of rejection because they were identified as informers
during the period of the Commission’s mandate. The problem
is complex and not readily resolved and the Commission was
unable, in the vast majority of cases, to prove or disprove such
allegations. However, the ongoing persecution of these socalled informers is a serious hindrance to the process of reconciliation.312

The Commission recommended the development of a process of
reintegration and rehabilitation for collaborators to remedy
their situation.313 It suggested ceremonies or mediation involving political parties or community organizations as a means of
facilitating “a public process of reintegration and forgiveness.”314 Appearing before the Commission itself allowed
for some to be exonerated after having been falsely accused of
being collaborators.315
The truth commissions for Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, South
Korea, and South Africa emphasized the profound stigma that
attaches to collaboration with the enemy and its enduring implications for post-conflict societies. Such stigma and its consequences invariably arise in any conflict or post-conflict context
and can endure for decades.316 The recent opening of Norway’s
archives regarding the 90,000 cases of alleged treason after the
Second World War prompted concern that the stigma of being a
traitor would attach even to those investigated but not prosecuted for treason.317
Collaboration with an opposing side during an armed conflict
can carry negative implications for both suspected individuals
312. Id. at 307.
313. Id. at 310.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 364 65.
316. DAVID FRENCH, FIGHTING EOKA: THE BRITISH COUNTER-INSURGENCY ON
CYPRUS, 1955-1959 8 (2015); Penter, supra note 32, at 364; See also BIRSTEIN,
supra note 33, at 175.
317. Nina Berglund, Norway to open war treason archives, NEWS IN ENGLISH
(May 15, 2014), http://www.newsinenglish.no/2014/05/15/norway-to-openwar-treason-archives/.
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and their families. The United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 conflict in the Gaza Strip, for example, encountered significant reluctance on the part of family
members of executed collaborators to come before it because of
such stigma:
The summary executions had devastating consequences that
extend well beyond the acts themselves. Since they are widely
perceived as evidence of the victims’ guilt, the stigma that accompanies them “punishes” the relatives. Witnesses spoke of
the executions as indelible stains on the family’s reputation
and honour, which can be long-lasting and translate into various forms of discrimination, including in terms of access to
education and employment. Witnesses described how relatives of those executed face exclusion and could not find jobs
as a result of the executions.318

In a post-conflict context such as Northern Ireland, informers
and their families continue to be ostracized from their communities.319 According to Ron Dudai, informers are “the most reviled” of all conflict participants and remain the “unforgiven”
actors in Northern Ireland: “while at least many in the affected
communities were willing to hold some form of normalized contact with the groups with whom they fought for decades, such
willingness to move on’ was not extended to informers.”320
The strength of emotion engendered by collaboration with an
opposing side during a violent conflict will almost inevitably
stymie efforts aimed at acknowledging and confronting the
practice and its consequences after a conflict’s end.321 At the
very least, transparency as to what has occurred is a necessary
step towards rehabilitating a class of conflict participants that
may remain excluded from society. Although falling outside the
context of armed conflict, the reunification of Germany
prompted debates as to whether the public should be given access to the files of the Ministry of State Security, which contained detailed information of its widespread use of inform-

318. Human Rights Council, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to Human Rights
Council resolution S-21/1, A/HRC/29/CRP.4, 130, 132 (2015).
319. Dudai, supra note 13, at 33.
320. Id. at 35, 36, 38.
321. Id. at 39 40, 48 49.
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ers.322 The 1991 Stasi Records Law facilitated such public access and sought to strike a balance between access to information and the rights of individuals by allowing certain access
to materials, while also restricting some of the uses of these
files.323 The Gauck Authority had responsibility for managing
access to the Stasi files and was tasked with assessing whether
individuals were collaborators with the Stasi, albeit on the basis of incomplete or inaccurate information at times, which may
not have revealed the extent to which duress or blackmail were
employed.324 Those found to have collaborated suffered consequences, including being barred from certain employment and
having their identities disclosed to victims.325 While this may
have led to further unforeseen exclusions, the process of allowing access to such files opened up to examination one of the
most notorious systems of citizen surveillance.
CONCLUSION
The challenges for countries, societies, and individuals in
coming to terms with past collaboration during times of war
can be significant, and it may take decades before the emergence of a willingness and opportunity to confront this aspect of
a difficult past.326 This article has explored the formal
measures employed by state authorities to address the phenomenon of collaboration or to hold individual collaborators to
account.327 The post-war responses to collaboration with the
enemy during an armed conflict have been largely punitive,
with accountability mechanisms serving as a means of revenge,
322. See Louisa McClintock, Facing the Awful Truth; Germany Confronts
the Past, Again, 52 PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM 32, 37 (2005).
323. Id. See also John Miller, Settling Accounts with a Secret Police: The
German Law on the Stasi Records, 50 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES 305 (1998).
324. McClintock, supra note 322, at 32, 38 39; Miller, supra note 323, at
322 23.
325. Miller, supra note 323, at 318.
326. See e.g. COLLABORATION WITH THE NAZIS: PUBLIC DISCOURSE AFTER THE
HOLOCAUST (Roni Stauber ed., 2010); Michael R. Marrus, Coming to Terms
with Vichy, 9 HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE STUD. 23 (1995); ELSTER, supra note
19.
327. On more informal mechanisms see for example Kieran McEvoy, Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice, 34
J. L. SOC’Y 411 (2007); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW: GRASSROOTS
ACTIVISM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CHANGE (Kieran McEvoy & Lorna McGregor
eds., 2008).
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retribution, and lustration of those considered traitors. Following the end of conflict, informers and other collaborators have
been the subjects of violent reprisals, public humiliation, criminal prosecution, capital punishment, imprisonment, hard labor, dismissal from their posts, denial of civil rights, and ostracization from society. The wide-ranging purge of collaborators
after the Second World War exemplified this approach.
Post-conflict trials of collaborators, including those following
the Second World War, have also been commonly deployed. In
the past, these trials were not overly encumbered by existing
legal constraints, such as the principle of legality. For involuntary collaborators, duress has offered a limited defense, and its
application reveals the limitations of criminal trials or courtmartials as a means of coming to terms with the complexities of
collaboration. In some individual cases, the stain of collaboration has proved indelible and accountability has arisen many
decades after the cessation of hostilities, such as by way of denaturalization proceedings or criminal prosecution. International law has not dictated how a state should address the phenomenon of collaboration during armed conflict, but increasingly offers normative guidance that can influence the form of relevant transitional justice measures. Certain punitive measures
taken by states to address the phenomenon of collaboration
have not always accorded with their human rights obligations,
for example.328
Efforts to address collaboration post-conflict have at times
recognized collaborators as potential victims, or at least as victims of circumstances that should not necessarily be subject to
formal sanctions. Authorities have occasionally sought to address collaboration with a view to societal reconstruction.
States have used amnesty to shield collaborators and other
participants in conflict from criminal prosecution, which may
raise tensions with international law. Truth commissions have
served to provide an understanding of both the causes and consequences of collaboration during armed conflict. As it has often been the case that “[c]ollaborators, spies and double agents
328. A series of European Court of Human Rights cases have challenged
certain measures, see for example De Becker v. Belgium, App no 214/5, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (1962); Lehideux & Isorni v. France, App no 24662/94, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(1998); Zawisa v. Poland, App no 37293/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); i kus v.
Lithuania, App no 26652/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Turek v. Slovakia, App no
57986/00 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006).
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did their work in secrecy and silence,”329 the reports and public
activities of truth commissions have shined a light on such covert activities and demonstrated how they entail serious and
destructive consequences for both individuals and communities.
Informed by the testimony of victims, perpetrators, and officials, truth commissions have offered a more complete picture
of the phenomenon of collaboration during a conflict, unencumbered by the restrictions inherent in individualized criminal
trials. Truth commission reports have facilitated a deeper understanding of the rationales underlying such practices, the
patterns of violence associated with collaboration, and the impact on particular groups in society, including women. Such
efforts have occasionally recognized the limitations of the victim-perpetrator binary. Truth commissions have also identified
the challenges faced by implicated individuals after the end of
conflict and suggested potential reforms or processes for state
authorities or other actors to undertake that may contribute to
societal reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation.
The post-conflict environment offers a unique opportunity for
coming to terms with the unsettling and often hidden aspect of
armed conflict that is collaboration with an opposing side. International humanitarian law has adopted a permissive stance
towards the practice itself, albeit subject to an overall prohibition of coercion for such purposes, but offers limited guidance
on how the phenomenon might be addressed when conflict
ends. There are particular challenges in dealing with what may
be considered as the shameful behavior of collaborators in wartime, and the vexing question of whether such persons might
themselves be considered as victims in some respects. The
suitability or desirability of specific measures or mechanisms
that may be deployed for this purpose as examined in this article will need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking into
consideration the needs of individuals and society, including
the maintenance of peace and security and relevant obligations
under international law, such as the rights of victims to justice,
truth, and reparation.

329. 5 THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, supra
note 14, at 299.

